abolishing the tacit admission rule as to both pre- and post-arrest silence because “neither logic nor common experience any longer supports the tacit admission rule, if, indeed, either ever supported it”
How later courts described this case
- abolishing the tacit admission rule as to both pre- and post-arrest silence because “neither logic nor common experience any longer supports the tacit admission rule, if, indeed, either ever supported it”
- noting that the doctrine of stare decisis does not render the courts helpless to correct their past errors
- "[W]hen a litigant makes a motion for a mistrial immediately after the question or questions are asked that are the grounds made the basis of the motion for the mistrial, and the grounds for the motion are clear and definite, then the motion for mistrial will preserve for review lesser prayers for relief, such as an objection or motion to strike."
- “when a litigant makes a motion for a mistrial immediately after the question or questions are asked that are the grounds made the basis of the motion for the mistrial, and the grounds for the motion are clear and definite, then the motion for mistrial will preserve for review lesser prayers for relief, such as an objection or motion or strike”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
The majority admittedly changes the law by holding that a motion for mistrial is a substitute for an objection. The law prior to this time had unequivocally held that a motion for mistrial is no substitute for an objection. Hunt v. State , 453 So.2d 1083 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Farley v. State , 437 So.2d 639 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).
It is obvious that counsel for the defendant, in his motion for mistrial, based his objection upon the failure of the State to produce in response to a pretrial request a "tacit admission" of the defendant. In my opinion, objections to the introduction of evidence should be specific enough that the trial judge knows upon what ground the objection is based. Clearly, a trial judge should not be put in error for overruling the motion for mistrial, which was based upon one legal ground, and have counsel for defendant argue on appeal an entirely different ground for the rejection of the evidence.
Based on these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
KENNEDY, J., concurs.