concluding that defendant waived a jury instruction issue because “the [d]efendant did not object to this instruction and, in fact, appeared to be in agreement with the trial court’s resolution of the issue”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that defendant waived a jury instruction issue because “the [d]efendant did not object to this instruction and, in fact, appeared to be in agreement with the trial court’s resolution of the issue”
- noting that the defendant failed to include a transcript of the ex parte hearing on expert funding but holding that, on the basis of the record provided, the defendant had not established particularized need
- “In other words, [improper argument] will be reversible error if the improper comments of the prosecutor were so improper or the argument so inflammatory that it affected the verdict.”
- affirming the plaintiff’s convictions and death sentence on direct appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Sharon G. Lee, J., concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion except for the analysis regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) by limiting consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought.
State v. Bland
,
958 S.W.2d 651
, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in
State v. Pruitt
,
415 S.W.3d 180
, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In
Pruitt
, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court's decision to continue following the
Bland
approach, as it improperly narrowed the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D).
Pruitt
,
415 S.W.3d at 230
(Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-
Bland
proportionality analysis by considering "all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed" and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not.
Id.
at 230-31
(Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
I have performed the broader, pre-
Bland
review in this case, as I find it more consistent with the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D). Based on a review of similar first degree murder cases, including those in which the death penalty was not sought, I have concluded that Mr. Jones's personal background and the nature of the crimes
he committed more closely resemble the personal backgrounds and the crimes committed by other persons who have received a death sentence than those that have not. Accordingly, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) and based on the facts in this record, I find that Mr. Jones's death sentence is "[neither] excessive [n]or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant."