The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Crampton, dissenting:
Despite a reluctance to express disagreement with a majority of the court, I am compelled in this case to indicate my dissent and to set forth my reasons for so doing.
In my opinion the acquisition of vacant land, and its development for residential uses unrestricted to low-rent accommodations, is not sufficiently related to the subject of slum clearance to satisfy our constitutional requirement that no act shall embrace more than one subject. A majority of the court bases its conclusion to the contrary upon the rule that an act may include “the means reasonably necessary or appropriate to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose” (in this case the protection of public health and safety by eradicating slum and blighted areas.) The basic question, therefore, is whether the construction of residences unlimited to low-rent housing will substantially contribute to the removal of slums.
In answering this question it is not sufficient to say that increasing the number of residences will alleviate the housing shortage. It is common knowledge that slums and their attendant evils existed long prior to the housing shortage, and that a plentiful supply of houses, or a furtherance of “community growth,” does not prevent their spread. To be sure, a supply of houses available at a price range of $12,000 to $18,000, as in the case at bar, will solve the problem for persons who can afford them; and, in so far as the result is not simply to provide more living space per person within that class, some benefits may filter down to persons of low income by making available accommodations formerly occupied by others. But this indirect and tenuous effect upon opportunities for residents of slum areas is not the type of relationship contemplated by the provision in question. No two subjects are so wide apart that they may not be brought into a common focus, if the point of view be carried back far enough. But if realities are recognized it will be seen that slum clearance on the one hand, and a general housing development on the other, are matters which constitute distinct and separate subjects. The evils of slums — the disease and crime ordinarily associated with congested, unsanitary living quarters — are not, of course, among the characteristics of vacant land. And except for appropriate redevelopment of sites formerly occupied by the cleared slums, a matter not involved here, the construction elsewhere of residences beyond the means of the persons displaced can have no appreciable effect in alleviating those evils.
No cases have been found involving the precise question presented herein. However, in cases where slum clearance and housing provisions have been upheld even though combined in a single statute, courts have been careful to point out that the housing accommodations to be erected (elsewhere than on the slum area to be redeveloped) shall be “for persons of the prescribed restrictive incomes;” and that the purpose is to eliminate unsafe, inadequate dwellings and to substitute in their stead decent habitations “for persons heretofore compelled to live under slum conditions.” (See, e.g., Thomas v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 234 Minn. 221 , 48 N.W. 2d 175 ; Dorman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209 , 200 Atl. 834 .) In the latter case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Schaffer and Drew, JJ., dissenting) observed: “As a necessary concomitant of slum elimination, therefore, provision is made in the Housing Authorities Law for the erection (without profit, and through the enjoyment of federal subsidies, of low-cost housing projects in which to shelter the evicted inhabitants of slum areas. True, it cannot be definitely proved that those who live in the tenements to be demolished will be those who, in whole or in part, will occupy the new dwellings, but the legislation is evidently planned to accomplish that result, and whether the object will be attained or not is a matter for the judgment and responsibility of the legislature.” In the case at bar, on the other hand, the statute is manifestly not planned to accomplish such a result, for the residences contemplated for the vacant land to be taken are not such as will be within the financial resources of persons displaced by the slum clearance. Certainly, persons whose means are insufficient to enable them to rent dwellings outside of slum districts can hardly be expected to afford houses of the type involved in this case. The acquisition of vacant land for general residential development is clearly not a means adapted to the elimination of the crime and health problems created by slum and blighted areas. It is a substantive undertaking or object in itself, involving other and different considerations. The two matters have no proper legislative relation to each other and are not parts of the same legislative scheme. They may not, in my opinion, be joined in the same act.
I must also express my disagreement with the concluson of the court that the Amendatory Act may properly authorize use of the bond proceeds for “the additional objectives” provided by the amendment. The question presented to the voters was specific. It apprised them that the proposed bonds were to be issued “to aid in the eradication and elimination of slum and blighted areas.” To the ordinary person asked to vote upon the proposition, the phrase “slum and blighted areas” refers to unsightly places where people are living under undesirable conditions; where disease, crime and juvenile delinquency may be expected to originate ; where fire and health hazards normally are found to exist. It would not commonly be understood to mean vacant land having none of such objectionable features, but merely being subject to ownership diversity or tax delinquency. It seems clear that the Amendatory Act — under which the entire proceeds of the bonds may conceivably be used for the purchase and development of vacant land at the expense of actual slum clearance — introduces a new and different use, a use for residences not even restricted to low-rent accommodations where some indirect effect upon the slum areas might be hoped for. Indeed, by section 24 itself the legislature has recognized that the purposes embodied in the amendments are “additional” ones and not merely aspects of the original purpose. If the proposed use of the bond proceeds is within the scope of the original act and an essential part of its program, as suggested in the majority opinion, there would seem to have been little necessity for an amendment at all.
A conclusion that there is a diversion from the original purpose does not depend upon any “myopic reading” of the question submitted to the voters. On the contrary, it is based upon the rule that words are presumably used and understood according to their ordinary usage. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the phrase “slum and blighted areas” had any other than its usual meaning to the voters who approved the bond issue. It is no answer to plaintiff’s contention to say that the development of vacant areas for housing purposes is “related to” the elimination of slums. The referendum did not refer to all purposes “related to” the one specified, nor does relationship result in identity either of function or of name.
When the governing body of a municipality is authorized by a vote of the people, and only thereby, to incur a debt for a particular purpose, such purpose must be strictly complied with. Funds so raised cannot with justice be diverted to some other purpose. The rule that the State may abolish a municipality and control the disposition of its property and funds does not constitute a carte blanche for designating the uses to which the proceeds of bonds issued pursuant to a referendum may be devoted. Such an application could completely frustrate the will of the people directly concerned, and would seriously impair the principles of right and justice by which our laws should always be tested. There is no adequate reason why the purpose for which bonds are to be issued should not be specifically stated on the ballots. When, as here, it is so stated, any use of the proceeds for additional purposes is a wrongful diversion and should be unequivocally condemned by the courts. In my estimation the majority conclusion condones a deception of the voters, denies them their right of choice, and sets a dangerous precedent for vague, ambiguous interpretations of the uses for which future bond issues may be employed.