holding that the trial court committed reversible error in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s key witness regarding his expectation of leniency from the State
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court committed reversible error in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s key witness regarding his expectation of leniency from the State
- holding that “the defense of imperfect self-defense does not apply and is not available to mitigate” unlawful shooting with intent to disable
- holding that trial court abused its discretion in limiting defense’s cross-examination of former cell mate about his hope of State’s leniency
- the jury, as the trier of fact, is responsible for “resolving credibility issues”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARRELL, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached in the Majority opinion and most of the reasoning explaining that result. I depart, however, from its somewhat obscure repudiation of two of this *640 Court’s opinions (Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578 , 671 A.2d 974 (1996); and Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95 , 613 A.2d 379 (1992)), apparently in favor of the dissent in Ebb and a Court of Special Appeals’s opinion, Leeks v. State, 110 Md.App. 543 , 678 A.2d 80 (1996), authored by Judge Murphy while serving on the intermediate appellate court.
The Majority opinion need not overrule any part of either Ebb or Watkins in order to reach its goal in the present case. Rather, Ebb and Watkins may be distinguished from the case at hand on the basis explained by the Majority opinion at 635-37, 996 A.2d at 879-81. Moreover, when this Court disapproves its earlier precedent, in whole or in part, it should do so on a principled basis transparently explained in the subsequent opinion. I cannot say that the Majority opinion here does so and most certainly it does not persuade me to join its rejection of Ebb and Watkins .