holding that federal officials can be sued personally for money damages for the alleged violation of constitutional rights stemming from official acts. Federal officials can also be subjected to claims against them in their individual capacity for official acts based upon state common law, statutory provisions and professional licensing matters.
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal officials can be sued personally for money damages for the alleged violation of constitutional rights stemming from official acts. Federal officials can also be subjected to claims against them in their individual capacity for official acts based upon state common law, statutory provisions and professional licensing matters.
- stating that direct constitutional damage remedy should at least be available “for the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police conduct,” keeping in mind that “the countervailing interests in efficient law enforcement of course argue for a protective zone with respect to many types of Fourth Amendment violations”
- holding that a remedy is available for a federal agent’s violation of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and Braxton is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee for this case in installments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. seizures
- holding that an individual may bring a private cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, even in the absence of statutory authority, and is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of a federal agent's violation of the Fourth Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by BARRIOS v. HASKELL COUNTY PUBLIC FACILITIES AUTHORITY FOUTCH v. TURN KEY HEALTH, 2018 OK 90 (2018)
More tellingly, the Supreme Court has suggested that the continuing validity of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson turns in part on the lack of congressional disapproval of the decisions.
Declined to follow by Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020)
Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field.
Declined to follow by Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287 (2006)
We decline to extend the Bivens cause of action to these circumstances, both because the actions of the private prison employees are not fairly attributable to the federal government and because the inmate has adequate remedies under state law for his alleged injuries.
Declined to follow by Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (1988)
While we decline to extend Bivens remedies to Hubbard and Spagnola, we do not suggest that the CSRA precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the constitutional claims of federal employees and job applicants altogether.
Declined to follow by Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Soto, 916 F.2d 1377 (1989)
In light of the impressive array of cases on point, we decline to follow Professor Davis’s suggestion that Bivens be held to apply to official capacity suits against the United States.
Declined to follow by Mirmehdi v. United States, 662 F.3d 1073 (2011)
Accordingly, we decline to extend Bivens to allow the Mirmehdis to sue federal agents for wrongful detention pending deportation given the extensive remedial procedures available to and invoked by them and the unique foreign policy considerations implicated in the immigration context.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (2014)
They argue, primarily, that Bivens’ alternative remedy framework is inapplicable, because Bivens suits involve money damages, and not equitable relief, and, additionally, because there is no basis in the case law to suggest that it should be applied to the APA.
Distinguished by Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2009)
Even so, the authority cited by Judge Calabresi, which suggests deciding whether a claim is stated before doing Bivens analysis, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 47 (2004)
The city argues that Bivens is inapplicable here because it involved claims against individual officers, not the federal agency.
Distinguished by Turner v. Holbrook, 278 F.3d 754 (2002)
Turner contends her Bivens claims are distinguishable because postal inspectors, that is, law enforcement officers, interrogated her about possible criminal violations.
The opinion
Me. Justice Black,
dissenting.
In my opinion for the Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), we did as the Court states, reserve the question whether an unreasonable search made by a federal officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment gives the subject of the search a federal cause of action for damages against the officers making the search. There can be no doubt that Congress could create a federal cause of action for damages for an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although Congress has created such a federal cause of action against state officials acting under color of state law, * it has never created such a cause of action against federal officials. If it wanted to do so, Congress could, of course, create a remedy against *428 federal officials who violate the Fourth Amendment in the performance .of their duties. But the point of this case and the fatal weakness in the Court’s judgment is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation creating such a right of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us.
Even if we had the legislative power to create a remedy, there are many reasons why we should decline to create a cause of action where none has existed since the formation of our Government. The courts of the United States as well as those of the States are choked with lawsuits. The number of cases on the docket of ' this Court have reached an unprecedented volume in recent years. A majority of these cases are brought by citizens with substantial complaints — persons who are physically or economically, injured by torts or frauds or governmental infringement óf their rights; persons who have been unjustly deprived of their liberty or their property; and persons who have not yet received the equal opportunity in education, employment, and pursuit of happiness that was the dream of our forefathers. Unfortunately, there have also been a growing number of frivolous lawsuits, particularly actions for damages against law enforcement officers whose conduct has been judicially sanctioned by state trial and appellate courts and in many instances even by this Court. My fellow Justices on this Court and our brethren throughout the federal judiciary know only too well the time-consuming task of conscientiously poring over hundreds of thousands of pages of factual allegations of misconduct by police, judicial, and corrections officials. Of course,» there are instances of legitimate grievances, but legislators might well desire to devote judicial resources to other problems of a more serious nature.
*429 We sit at the top of a judicial system accused by some of nearing the point of collapse. Many criminal defendants do not receive speedy trials and neither society nor the accused are assured of justice when inordinate delays occur. Citizens must wait years to litigate their private civil suits. Substantial changes in correctional and parole systems demand the attention of the lawmakers and the judiciary. If I were a legislator I might well find these and other needs so pressing as to make me believe that the resources of lawyers and judges should be devoted to them rather than to civil damage actions against officers who generally strive to perform within constitutional bounds. There is also a real danger that such suits might deter officials from the proper and honest performance of their duties.
All of these considerations make imperative careful study and weighing of the arguments both for and against the creation of such a remedy under the Fourth Amendment. I would have great difficulty for myself in resolving the competing policies, goals, and priorities in the use of resources, if I thought it were my job to resolve those questions.^ But that is not my task. The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States. Congress has not provided that any federal court can entertain a suit against a federal officer for violations of Fourth Amendment rights occurring in the performance of his duties. A strong inference can be drawn from creation of such actions against state officials that Congress does not' desire to permit such suits against federal officials. Should the time come when Congress desires such lawsuits, it has "before it a modehof valid legislation, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 , to create a damage remedy against federal officers. Cases could be cited to support the legal proposition which *430 I assert, but it seems to me to be a matter of common understanding that the business of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and not to make them.
I dissent.
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 .