Opinion

PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

  • 881 F.3d 75
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jan 31, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Randolph
On the bench
Garland, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Griffith, Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, Katsas, Randolph
Cited by
67 cases
Authority
More cited than 13.5%

Abrogated on other grounds by Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020)

explaining that "the chairpersons of five independent agencies serve on the Council, each of whom the President has the opportunity to appoint either at the outset or near the beginning of the administration" and "[o]nly four members of the FSOC have terms longer than four years and are thus potentially not appointed by a one-term President"

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that "the chairpersons of five independent agencies serve on the Council, each of whom the President has the opportunity to appoint either at the outset or near the beginning of the administration" and "[o]nly four members of the FSOC have terms longer than four years and are thus potentially not appointed by a one-term President"
  • concluding that the distinction between inferior and principal officers is irrelevant in removal cases because they are concerned not with whether the officer exercises governmental authority, but with whether the officer’s independence interferes with the President’s constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws
  • emphasizing the CFPB’s structure 1 Indeed, Harris’s declaration recites that she “cannot issue adjudication decisions unilaterally,” Harris Decl. ¶ 26 (Harris Opp’n App. B at 5), thereby conceding that perhaps her most expansive action to date—“staying” the termination of executive branch employees by the thousands—is not in fact adjudicative. 6 as a threat to individual liberty
  • discussing the nation's "deeply rooted tradition-namely, that independent agencies are headed by multiple commissioners-[that] has been widely recognized by leading judges, congressional committees, and academics who have studied the issue"

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020)

    881 F.3d 75, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), abrogated by Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 29, 20207 citing opinionsother groundsRead it
  • Abrogated on other grounds by June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)

    881 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds sub nom. Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2182
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 29, 2020other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I entirely agree with Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion. 1 I write to identify a separate constitutional issue that provides an additional reason for setting aside not only the order of the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, but also all proceedings before the CFPB’s Administrative Law Judge, including his Recommended Decision.

After the CFPB’s enforcement unit filed a Notice of Charges against PHH, an Administrative Law Judge held a nine-day hearing and issued a recommended decision, concluding that petitioners had violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974. In PHH’s administrative appeal, the Director “affirm[ed]” the ALJ’s conclusion that PHH had violated that Act.

I believe the ALJ who presided over the hearing was an “inferior Officer” within the meaning of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. That constitutional provision requires “inferior Officers” to be appointed by the President, the “Courts of Law,” or the “Heads of Departments.” This ALJ was not so appointed. Pursuant to an agreement between the CFPB and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge assigned him to the case. In addition to the unconstitutional structure of the CFPB, this violation of the Appointments Clause rendered the proceedings against PHH unconstitutional.

This case is indistinguishable from Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 , 111 S.Ct. 2631 , 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991). My reasoning is set forth in Landry v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1140-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). There is no need to repeat what I wrote there. The majority opinion in Landry disagreed with my position, but PHH has preserved the issue for judicial review. The CFPB has argued that PHH waived the issue because it did not raise it before the CFPB. But the Freytag petitioners also raised their constitutional objection to the appointment of the special trial judge for the first time on appeal. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 892-95 , 111 S.Ct. 2631 (Scalia, J., concurring). There is no difference between this case and Freytag, except that in light of the majority opinion in Landry it would have been futile for PHH to object, a point that cuts in PHH’s favor.

Since the panel decision in this case, several developments have occurred with respect to the Appointments Clause issue. The Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), pet. for cert. pending, No. 17-475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017), disagreed with the majority opinion in Landry and held that the SEC’s ALJs are invested with powers that require their appointment as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. In addition, the Fifth Circuit granted a stay of an FDIC order because the respondent had established a likelihood of success on his claim that the ALJ who presided over his proceeding was an officer who was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017). In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit also expressly disagreed with Law-dry,

In the meantime, our court, sitting en banc, split 5 to 5 in Lucia v. SEC, a case in which the panel—relying on Landry -had reached a conclusion in direct conflict with Bandimere. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc). On June 26, 2017, the equally-divided en banc court issued a per curiam order denying the petition for review.'

On November 29, 2017, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the SEC, filed a response to Lucia’s certiorari petition. The Solicitor General confessed error and acquiesced in .certiorari.'That is, the S.G. agreed that the SEC’s ALJs are “inferior officers” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and, as such, were not properly appointed. Brief for the Respondent at 10-19, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (filed Nov. 29, 2017). On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2018 WL 386565 , — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 736 , 199 L.Ed.2d 602 (S.Ct. Jan. 12, 2018).

Given this state of affairs, the en banc majority, should withhold any order remanding this case to the CFPB until the Supreme Court decides Lucia. Cf. Order, Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 15-1416 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 20Í7); Order, J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt. v. SEC, No. 16-72703 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2017). As the Court held in Freytag, Appointments Clause violations go “to the validity” of the underlying proceedings. 501 U.S. at 879 , 111 S.Ct. 2631 . Suppose the Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor General in Lucia, which seems entirely probable. Then not only the CFPB Director’s order, but'also all proceedings before the ALJ, including the ALJ’s Recommended Decision, would be invalid.

Nevertheless, the majority—relying on the order granting en banc in PHH— remands the case to the CFPB ■ without waiting for the Supreme Court to decide Lucia.- Maj. Op. at 83-84. The en banc order stated: “While not otherwise limited, the parties are directed to address” the consequences of a decision that the ALJ in Lucia was an inferior officer. Order, PHH Corp. v. CFPB, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (emphasis added).

Two points about the order are worth noting. The first is that the order limited neither the issues to , be argued nor the issues to be decided. The second is that the order embodied the en banc court’s judgment that the. proper disposition of this case required consideration of the outcome in Lucia. Of course, the posture has changed. At the time of the en banc order, Lucia was pending in this court; now Lucia is pending in the Supreme Court. That difference makes it all the more important that we wait for the Supreme Court’s decision.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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