finding no probable cause was established in the warrant application when the officer asserted that a murder weapon would be found at the defendant’s home 15 months after the murder occurred, because the defendant was a felon, not permitted to lawfully own a firearm, and would likely have retained the weapon because it would be difficult to replace; the inference of unlawful possession was found to be wholly speculative
How later courts described this case
- finding no probable cause was established in the warrant application when the officer asserted that a murder weapon would be found at the defendant’s home 15 months after the murder occurred, because the defendant was a felon, not permitted to lawfully own a firearm, and would likely have retained the weapon because it would be difficult to replace; the inference of unlawful possession was found to be wholly speculative
- holding that minor inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony and surveillance-video evidence did not warrant a finding that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; “the [fact-finder] is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s evidence in the manner that it sees fit”
- explaining that the possessory offense, in and of itself, is not dispositive; rather, Peterkin requires us to focus upon whether the defendant is charged with possessing a certain item or contraband at the time of the contested search and seizure
- rejecting the trial court’s “categorical assumption” that people “generally hold on to guns . . . and that, as such, probable cause to search for guns exists in apparent perpetuity” in support of its finding that probable cause existed to search a defendant’s residence for a firearm fifteen months after the commission of a crime
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE DONOHUE, concurring and dissenting opinion
I join the Majority’s reasoning and disposition with respect to all of Jacoby’s issues, except with respect to part VIII, on which I join in Chief Justice Saylor’s Dissenting Opinion with respect to the denial of Jacoby’s request for a Frye hearing on the subject of Y-STR DNA testing. For this reason, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling.