holding there is presumption against imposition of life without parole sentence for juvenile murder defendants; Commonwealth must provide notice of its intent to seek such sentence; Commonwealth must rebut presumption with proof beyond reasonable doubt that “juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and thus is unable to be rehabilitated[;]” and court must consider the factors announced in Miller and [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1102.1(d)” before imposing sentence of life without parole
How later courts described this case
- holding there is presumption against imposition of life without parole sentence for juvenile murder defendants; Commonwealth must provide notice of its intent to seek such sentence; Commonwealth must rebut presumption with proof beyond reasonable doubt that “juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and thus is unable to be rehabilitated[;]” and court must consider the factors announced in Miller and [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1102.1(d)” before imposing sentence of life without parole
- Finding legislative acquiescence to the Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 295 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I) Court’s interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, since “[d]espite the passage of four years since we issued Batts I, the General Assembly has not passed a statute addressing the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder pre-Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)], nor has it amended the pertinent provisions that were severed in Batts I.”
- holding that a challenge to the imposition of a life- without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender implicated the legality of sentencing because, under our now abrogated understanding of the relevant decisions by the United States Supreme Court, such a sentence could be imposed “upon a juvenile offender only if [the sentencing court determines that] the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s permanent incorrigibility”
- stating that “[s]ubsection (e) makes clear that [35 years in prison] is only the minimum sentence required…. In determining the minimum sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller, a -4- J-S45002-18 sentencing court is to exercise its discretion to find the appropriate, individualized sentence in each case, just as it would when fashioning the minimum sentence for any other defendant before it.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated by Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021)
163 A.3d 410, 446 (Pa. 2017) (devising a procedure for imposing a sentence of life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders), abrogated by Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98
The opinion
JUSTICE WECHT,
concurring
I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full.
Recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence imposes a challenging task upon trial courts called upon to sentence juveniles convicted of murder. As well, it cannot be gainsaid that the Commonwealth’s burden in overcoming the presumption announced by the Majority is high. But, the Supreme Court of the United States has made its will clear in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, _ U.S. _, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), directing that life without parole sentences (“LWOP”) for juveniles should be rare and uncommon, and imposed only in “exceptional circumstances.” See Maj. Op. at 452 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736 ). 1
Our reversal of Batts’ sentence in the instant case illustrates the complexities and difficulties associated with sentencing juveniles in this context. Here, the trial court expended a significant amount of time and effort contemplating the testimony and expert evaluations of Batts, and reached a considered judgment on what the court believed was the correct sentence for Batts. The court then authored a comprehensive opinion detailing its factual determinations and its bases for sentencing Batts to life in prison without parole. All of these diligent efforts notwithstanding, the trial court still fell short of the new constitutional standard. In a routine sentencing appeal, the trial court’s decision would be nearly unassailable. In this singular context, however, the sentence must be ruled unconstitutional, despite the trial court’s commendable efforts.
I agree with the Majority that, while the Constitution does not require the Commonwealth to present expert testimony in order to overcome the evidentiary presumption against LWOP, see Maj. Op. at 455-56, it is “difficult to conceive” of situations where the Commonwealth can rebut that presumption without such testimony. Id. at 456. Following today’s decision, the Commonwealth likely will (and I believe *461 should) retain and present an expert in the vast majority of LWOP resentencing hearings, if not in all of them. That being the case, equity demands that trial courts exercise their discretion to provide such juveniles with their own expert, in the event that the juvenile cannot afford one on his or her own. This not only would ensure evenhandedness in the proceeding, but also would provide the trial court with a complete perspective of the juvenile, which is necessary in order to correctly navigate the framework that is established today by this Court.
Justice Todd joins this concurring opinion.
. See also Tatum v. Arizona, _ U.S. _, 137 S.Ct. 11, 13 , 196 L.Ed.2d 284 (2016) (per curiam) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the "very meaningful task for the lower courts to carry out” involves deciding "whether the juvenile offender before it is a child whose crimes reflect transient immaturity or is one of those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption for whom a life without parole sentence may be appropriate”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).