holding that the harmless error analysis in a criminal case requires the following: (1) The error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
How later courts described this case
- holding that the harmless error analysis in a criminal case requires the following: (1) The error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
- explaining that probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the police officer's knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested."
- concluding that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence when it received an unfavorable ruling on a motion filed by the - 18 - J-A23007-24 defendant, timely moved for reconsideration, and timely appealed denial of reconsideration
- explaining that excusable delay is not calculated against the Commonwealth in a Rule 600 analysis, as long as the Commonwealth acted with due diligence at all relevant times
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR,
Concurring
I join the majority opinion except for the harmless-error disposition attending the second claim asserted by Appellant, in which he invokes the prohibition against admission of statements made during plea discussions set forth in Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 410(a)(4). See Majority Opinion at 302-05, 154 A.3d at 787-88. Although I consider the issue to be a very close one, I tend toward the view that a specific confession to law enforcement officials is an especially powerful form of evidence that is rarely amenable to treatment as being merely cumulative of other evidence. Cf. Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 473-74 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[t]he persuasive influence of a signed confession cannot be underestimated” and suggesting that “a written confession can never truly be said to be merely cumulative”). See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (highlighting that “[a] confession is like no other evidence” in terms of its likely effect in assessments by jurors).
Thus, I would be more comfortable with a disposition premised on waiver, in the form of Appellant’s agreement that his statements could be used against him if the terms of his *320 arrangement with the prosecution were not met. 1 In this regard, I note that most jurisdictions hold, as concerns analogues to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 410(a)(4), that the protection is subject to knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 444 N.J.Super. 603 , 135 A.3d 157, 163 (App. Div. 2016) (collecting cases); accord Commonwealth v. Widmer, 120 A.3d 1023, 1027-28 (Pa. Super. 2015).
. See Commonwealth v. Burno, No. 2003/3637, CP-39-CR-0003637-2003, slip op. at 7 (C.P. Lehigh Sep. 28, 2015) (explaining that it was undisputed that Appellant understood that his statements could be used against him if the terms of his agreement with the Commonwealth were not met); Majority Opinion at 278-79, 154 A.3d at 772-73 (highlighting that after the plea negotiations resumed, Appellant was reminded of previously agreed terms); see also N.T., June 2, 2004, at 137 (reflecting an acknowledgment by Appellant's then-counsel concerning his understanding of such terms).