noting that the requisite culpable mental state may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances
How later courts described this case
- noting that the requisite culpable mental state may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances
- noting that the requisite culpable mental state may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances
- affirming § 38.02 sub silentio in finding that the elements of the crime' were fulfilled
- “Absent a judicial confession, the requisite culpable mental state must ordinarily be inferred from the acts of the accused or the surrounding circumstances.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In my judgment, the “agreed case” problem is knottier than any contemporaneous opinion has thus far indicated, and it needs to be addressed.
Article Y, Sec. 25 is an obscure provision in our Texas Constitution that is often overlooked. It grants to the Supreme Court “power to make and establish rules of procedure not inconsistent with the laws of this State for the government of said court and the other courts of this State ...” Equally little regarded is an opinion of the Court respecting that provision: Sessions v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 424 , 197 S.W. 718 (1917). It has not been overruled, according to Shepard’s Texas Citations.
The Sessions Court read Section 25 to include the Court of Criminal Appeals within a governance of rules of procedure made by the Supreme Court of Texas, and it acknowledged that indeed the Supreme Court had done so on at least one prior occasion. It also noted that the Supreme Court had made rules for the district court “for the purpose of directing the manner of preparing transcripts for appeal to this court.” See, e.g., Ratcliff v. State, 29 Tex.App. 248 , 15 S.W. 596 (1890): “The rules above cited are applicable to criminal as well as civil cases, and are for the government of appeals to this as well as to the supreme court.” Id., 597 .
Accordingly, the considered application of Rule 263 by the Austin Court of Appeals ought not now be rejected out of hand. That court is, after all, bound by rules established by the Supreme Court.
All that aside, however, Article 40.09, V.A.C.C.P., Section 11, itself, provides for an “agreed statement” of “the facts proven” such that an appellate court may “determine whether there is error in the trial.” The Austin Court of Appeals has made that determination, and I am not persuaded that this is a case wherein it is appropriate to substitute our collective judgment for that of three judges of the court of appeals. See Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.