instruction appropriate in a “stop-and-render-aid” case when defendant claimed that, because of excessive use of alcohol, she did not know she had struck anyone with her car
How later courts described this case
- instruction appropriate in a “stop-and-render-aid” case when defendant claimed that, because of excessive use of alcohol, she did not know she had struck anyone with her car
- instruction proper at guilt stage where evidence showed that because of intoxication, defendant was oblivious to her criminal conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Chauncey v. State, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (1994)
Before the trial court appellant cited Jaynes v. State, 673 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984), overruled in part, Chauncey v. State, 877 S.W.2d 305, 309 n.8
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the trial court erred in assessing a term of confinement in excess of the maximum authorized by law. For that reason alone the cause must be remanded. However, since Article 42.12, § 3, Y.A.C. C.P. expressly authorizes the trial court “to fix the period of probation without regard to the term of punishment assessed” so long as it is not greater than ten years, I cannot say with confidence of the majority that the Legislature did not intend precisely that which it wrote and, therefore, I would not say that § 3 may be read to limit a period of probation to the maximum term of confinement allowed by the statute. We should reserve the issue until presented with a situation where a trial court assessed punishment at a term within the statutory maximum but fixed a period of probation longer than the maximum but still less than ten years.
With that understanding I concur in the judgment of the Court.