No. Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed
How later courts described this case
- No. Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Houston v. Memphis & Shelby County Board of Adjustment, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (1972)
The Reddoch and Glankler cases, supra, are distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
On Petition to Rehear
Counsel for plaintiffs in error has filed a courteous, respectful and dignified petition to rehear. Ooncededly this petition is merely a re-argument of the second proposition considered in our opinion, which was so ably argued and briefed originally. There are no new or additional authorities cited. It is largely complained that we did not cite more authorities in our opinion, and certain authorities and excerpts from opinions heretofore cited and relied upon in oral argument are again sought to be cited as controlling in the assignments of error and brief on this proposition.
*227 We think that counsel for the plaintiffs in error overlooks the fact that this is an ‘ ‘ administrative board” rather than a “legislative body” that is acting* in the particular instance. We, in our original opinion, based it on this question entirely, that is, that these were the acts of an “administrative body” rather than the acts of a “legislative body”, and thus, as we see it, under our authorities there is substantial evidence to support the acts of this “administrative body”.
Of course, we could take up in the opinion all the authorities cited pro and con, but under the authorities of this State the acts of an “administrative body” when supported by material evidence is binding upon us.
Counsel again seeks to argue the proposition that the evidence we have concluded is material evidence is not such evidence. We for reasons stated in our original opinion must disagree. We have not held, and are not holding, that the rule of “unique hardship” does not obtain in Tennessee. All that we have held, and all that we can hold, under such a case as this as it now comes to us, is that there is material evidence to support the finding of the “administrative body” which has been concurred in by the trial judge, and that this being true there is nothing that we can do about the matter. We are not in any manner attempting to say anything about the holding of this Court in Grant v. McCullough, 196 Tenn. 671 , 270 S.W.2d 317 , with reference to “spot zoning”. The Act held unconstitutional in the Grant case was a ‘ ‘ legislative ’ ’ act, not the act of an “ administrative body”.
For reasons herein expressed the petition to rehear is denied.