recognizing that it is necessary to require testimony or the production of evidence—put forth by either a public or private prosecutor—to establish that a contempt occurred
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that it is necessary to require testimony or the production of evidence—put forth by either a public or private prosecutor—to establish that a contempt occurred
- holding that constructive contempt requires testimony or documentary evidence to establish the contemptuous conduct
- contemnor left courtroom peacefully under bailiff's escort, but physically attacked court master in doorway, causing general disturbance; that the judge was required to take evidence to ascertain exact nature of tumult not controlling
- involving a pro se litigant who created a disturbance during trial by fighting with the court bailiff after she was asked to leave the courtroom
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CAMPBELL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
While I believe the majority reached the correct result in this case, I write once again, as I did in Ex Parte Krupps, et al., 712 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) to address what I perceive to be a serious misinterpretation of the law of contempt.
At Maj. opinion pg. 710, the majority observes that in the presence of the court “does not necessarily mean in the immediate presence of the trial judge” and further, that “the court is present whenever any of its constituent parts, the courtroom, the jury and the jury room are engaged in pursuing the work of the court.” Citing Ex Parte Aldridge, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 395 , 334 S.W.2d, 161 (1960) the majority continues that “it was for this reason that the applicant in Ex Parte Aldridge, supra, was properly determined to have committed direct contempt when he placed contemptuous publications in the corridors of the courthouse where prospective jurors would necessarily see them.”
From my reading of the instant case, the contumacious conduct took place immediately in front of the judge (emphasis added) and it is therefore unnecessary for the majority in the instant case to revisit the gymnastics engaged in Krupps where it was observed “that court personnel, such as bailiffs, and implicitly, one imagines, court reporters, clerks, docket coordinators, probation officers, prosecutors, etc., may, through some sort of agency theory observe contumacious conduct, report said conduct to the unsuspecting judge thereby magically transforming constructive contempt into direct contempt, all in the name of and by the authority of being officers of the court.” Ex Parte Krupps, at 160 (Campbell, J. Dissenting).