“a defendant who elects to represent himself or herself has no constitutional right to advisory or stand-by counsel or any other form of ‘hybrid’ representation”
How later courts described this case
- “a defendant who elects to represent himself or herself has no constitutional right to advisory or stand-by counsel or any other form of ‘hybrid’ representation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., Concurring.
I concur completely in the result reached by the majority and I concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion, except for the discussion entitled “The Court Did Not Err in Failing to Appoint Advisory Counsel’ for Garcia.” As to that portion of the opinion I concur only in the result.
I am sympathetic with the concerns expressed by the majority regarding the circumstances in which advisory counsel can be or must be appointed for defendants who exercise their rights under Faretta v. California (1974) 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). Undoubtedly there is a tension between the claimed right to self-representation and the claim of some entitlement to the assistance of counsel, albeit in an advisory role. I also agree with the majority that we should not extend the rule of People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 , 64 A.L.R.4th 723 ] (Bigelow) to noncapital cases, absent specific direction form the Supreme Court.
I disagree with the majority’s criticism of Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731 in this case. First, Garcia never requested advisory counsel. Thus he presents an issue never addressed in Bigelow , namely whether a court has a sua sponte duty to appoint advisory counsel. Bigelow does not compel such result, nor has Garcia presented any credible authority for the creation of such duty. I agree completely with the majority’s conclusion that such rule is neither required, nor well advised.
I would end the analysis of this issue by holding there is no sua sponte duty in a noncapital case, which requires a trial court to appoint advisory counsel. In my view that is the only issue presented here. Thus the majority’s criticism of Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731 is a wholly unwarranted sojourn into a difficult area of constitutional law. It is certainly a trip which I am unwilling to take.
Nor am I willing to address the question of whether it can ever be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant the right to self-representation *1433 and deny a request for advisory counsel. First, as I have indicated, that issue is not before us. Second, I am not convinced that a trial court is required to allow self-representation under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 , where a defendant wants advisory counsel. Thus, I can conceive of circumstances where it would be an abuse of discretion to deny a request for advisory counsel. Such is not, of course, the case before us. Accordingly I cannot join in this portion of the majority opinion and concur only in its result.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 12, 2000.