holding, that a wrongful death action filed by a pro se plaintiff is not void ab initio because “the risks to individual clients and to the integrity of the legal system inherent in representation by a person who has never qualified to practice law are not present in the instant ease”
How later courts described this case
- holding, that a wrongful death action filed by a pro se plaintiff is not void ab initio because “the risks to individual clients and to the integrity of the legal system inherent in representation by a person who has never qualified to practice law are not present in the instant ease”
- where the plaintiff, special administrator of her father’s estate, followed the erroneous advice of her Illinois-licensed attorney, who lived out of state, that she should file a timely pro se complaint alleging the decedent’s wrongful death and have an attorney later amend it, the reviewing court held that the plaintiff should be permitted to file an amended complaint that related back to the original, stating that the nullity rule did not automatically apply and that its purposes would not be furthered by its application
- trial court erred in finding plaintiff’s complaint to be a nullity where she had consciously chosen to be represented by a licensed Illinois attorney before proceeding; had received guidance, direction and assurance from that attorney prior to filing her complaint; and was represented by licensed counsel, including the lawyer who initially counseled her, at every step of proceedings after the initial complaint was filed
- reinstating a complaint improperly filed pro se on behalf of an estate to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar when the plaintiff was represented by counsel at every stage since filing the complaint
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:
The majority accurately states that only licensed attorneys can represent other persons in legal actions and that unauthorized legal practice requires dismissal of a cause. See Ratcliffe v. Apantaku, 318 Ill. App. 3d 621 (2000); Leonard v. Walsh, 73 Ill. App. 2d 45 (1966); Blue v. People, 223 Ill. App. 3d 594 (1992). However, I believe the majority errs in finding an exception to this rule under the instant facts. I thus respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on three cases to construct its exception, all of which are distinguishable. In Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1985), the plaintiff retained a licensed attorney who was later disbarred unbeknownst to the plaintiff. In his disbarred state, the attorney filed a complaint that was later dismissed according to the above-stated rule. “Given these unique circumstances” (Janiczek, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 546 ), the court held that dismissal with prejudice was an unduly harsh sanction against the plaintiff, who never consciously chose to be represented by a lay person. Thus, an exception to the general rule was appropriate. In McEvers v. Stout, 218 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472 (1991) (involving an attorney licensed in Wisconsin but not Illinois), the court elucidated the rationale for this exception by stating: “a nullity rule appears to punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney.”
Unlike Janiczek and McEvers, the instant case does not involve a complaint filed by an unlicensed attorney for an unwitting client. Since Pratt-Holdampf prepared and filed her own complaint, she could not possibly claim that she thought the person initiating the suit was duly licensed. Accordingly, the unique circumstances mentioned above are not present. Without such circumstances, as the Janiczek court noted, the general rule of dismissal applies “even where the lay agent merely files the complaint over his own signature, and all subsequent court appearances are made by a duly licensed attorney.” Janiczek, 134 111. App. 3d at 545. This is apparently what happened in the instant case.
Neither is the decision in Moushon v. Moushon, 147 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1986), availing to Pratt-Holdampf. In that case, a corporation’s complaint (signed by its president, a nonattorney) survived because it stated that the corporation “[came] by its attorney.” Moushon, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 147 . The instant complaint, on the other hand, was prepared, signed, and filed by a nonattorney. The Moushon court distinguished this situation when making its decision.
The cases cited by the majority simply do not justify a departure from the well-established rule that nonattorneys cannot represent other parties in court. Accordingly, I dissent.