stating that the exemption in the Iowa Freedom of Information Act for "hospital records" and "medical records" of a "patient or former patient, including outpatient," did not apply to "county home" records in possession of the Governor's Office because the documents, which addressed the involuntary sterilization of the plaintiff, were neither compiled for diagnosis or treatment purposes by hospital or medical personnel nor maintained as records of a hospital or physician
How later courts described this case
- stating that the exemption in the Iowa Freedom of Information Act for "hospital records" and "medical records" of a "patient or former patient, including outpatient," did not apply to "county home" records in possession of the Governor's Office because the documents, which addressed the involuntary sterilization of the plaintiff, were neither compiled for diagnosis or treatment purposes by hospital or medical personnel nor maintained as records of a hospital or physician
- interpreting "medical records" as "documents . . . compiled for diagnostic or treatment purposes by hospital or medical personnel [or] maintained as records of a hospital or physician" (citations omitted)
- no liability in invasion of privacy action for disclosures of matters of public record which are of legitimate public concern
- judgment may be affirmed on grounds rejected by the trial court as well as on the ground accepted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McGIVERIN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result and the opinion except as to Division II from which I respectfully dissent.
As to Division II, I agree with the statement of the majority that “[i]n determining whether an item is newsworthy, courts cannot impose their own views about what should interest the community," but from that premise draw a different conclusion.
*305 I believe a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether publication by defendants newspaper and Engel in 1976 of plaintiff’s 1970 or 1971 sterilization was then newsworthy. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237.
I believe there are factors in this case which could lead reasonable persons to differ within the bounds of the first and fourteenth amendments in evaluation of legitimate public concern. Passage of time has been recognized as a significant factor in evaluating newsworthiness. See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, 4 Cal.3d 529 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 483 P.2d 34 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 CaLApp. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). Courts, too, have acknowledged that disclosure of identity can be a separate issue in an otherwise newsworthy story. Briscoe, 4 Cal.3d at 537 , 93 Cal.Rptr. at 871-72 , 483 P.2d at 39-40 (“We have no doubt that reports of the facts of past crimes are newsworthy. . . . However, identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serves little independent public purpose.”) (original emphasis).
Accordingly, a jury or trier of fact should be allowed at trial to apply the community standard articulated in the majority opinion and determine whether disclosure of plaintiff’s identity was morbid and sensational prying into her life for its own sake. A jury should decide this issue and not a court on summary judgment.
The court should have overruled the motion for summary judgment as to the newsworthiness ground. Therefore, I dissent from Division II.
REES, J., joins in this special concurrence and dissent.
HARRIS, J., joins as to the dissent to division II.