People v. Diaz

JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:

I agree that People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), applies to the plea agreement in this case. I write separately, however, to set forth my continued adherence to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 190 (2000) (Bilandic, J., dissenting).

In Evans, we held that the motion-for-sentence-reconsideration provisions of Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) apply only to “open,” as opposed to “negotiated,” guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 331-32 . We defined an open guilty plea as one in which a defendant pleads guilty “without receiving any promises from the State in return.” (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332 . The defendants in Evans agreed to plead guilty and, in exchange, the State promised to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence. The trial court accepted the plea agreements in both cases and entered judgments in accordance with the terms of the agreements. The defendants later sought to reduce their sentences to which they agreed without first moving to vacate their guilty pleas. We held that the defendants could not do this. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333-34 . To hold otherwise would violate basic contract law principles by allowing the defendants to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging on or modifying the terms that they had previously agreed to accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28 .

In Lumzy, the defendant was charged with robbery, a Class 2 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/18 — 1 (West 1998)), and aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/12 — 4 (West 1998)). At a hearing, the trial court advised defendant of the charges against him and that he faced possible prison sentences of three to seven years for the robbery, and two to five years for the aggravated battery. The trial court further advised defendant that he could receive extended prison terms and therefore be sentenced to prison terms of 14 and 10 years, respectively. The defendant and the State, however, ultimately reached a plea agreement. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to robbery in exchange for the State’s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and, following the defendant’s guilty plea to robbery, sentenced the defendant to seven years in prison. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 192 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).

A majority of this court in Lumzy held that the principles enunciated in Evans did not apply to the plea scenario at issue, and that the defendant could therefore challenge the length of his sentence without first filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The majority reasoned that the defendant “never agreed, impliedly or otherwise, to accept whatever sentence the trial court might have imposed.” Thus, according to the majority, the contract principles that guided this court’s decision in Evans did not prevent the defendant in Lumzy from appealing only the length of his sentence. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 187 .

I dissented in Lumzy on the basis that the defendant’s plea agreement was negotiated within the meaning of Evans. The plea agreement that the parties in Lumzy negotiated provided the defendant with the valuable benefit of a less severe sentence than he could have received had he been convicted of both robbery and aggravated battery. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 192-93 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Moreover, by pleading guilty to robbery in exchange for the State’s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge, the defendant in effect agreed that a sentence within the statutory range for robbery was appropriate. The defendant was in fact sentenced to seven years in prison for the robbery — a sentence within the statutory range. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 193 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Allowing the defendant to challenge the length of his sentence without also requiring him to move to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to its part of the plea bargain, i.e., the dismissal of the aggravated battery charge, while allowing the defendant the opportunity to renege on or modify the terms to which he had previously agreed. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 193 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Such a result is not proper under this court’s holding in Evans.

Today, the majority cites Lumzy and states that the plea agreement in Lumzy is distinguishable from the plea agreement in this case. 192 Ill. 2d at 223. The majority reasons that, in contrast to the plea agreement in Lumzy, where there was no agreement as to sentencing, the plea agreement in this case entails an agreement between the parties regarding the defendant’s sentence and, therefore, Evans applies. 192 Ill. 2d at 223. Although I agree that the principles set forth in Evans apply to the plea agreement in this case, I adhere to my view that these principles likewise apply to the plea agreement in Lumzy.

With the foregoing understanding, I concur in the majority’s decision.