holding that statute of frauds under the Uniform Commercial Code did not displace “long recognized” doctrine of promissory estoppel in an action for breach of an oral contract to sell grain
How later courts described this case
- holding that statute of frauds under the Uniform Commercial Code did not displace “long recognized” doctrine of promissory estoppel in an action for breach of an oral contract to sell grain
- holding that in Iowa promissory estoppel is a valid nonstatutory exception to the statute of frauds of U.C.C. article two
- applying principles of promissory es-toppel to contract for the sale of goods governed by Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) statute of frauds, relying on U.C.C. statute preserving common law principles such as estoppel
- “We have long recognized promissory estoppel as a means of defeating the general statute of frauds .... We hold that the provisions of § 554.2201 do not displace the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the sale of goods in Iowa.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*348 ALLBEE, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in division III of the Chief Justice’s dissent. I am also in agreement with that dissent on what I perceive as the two essential and central points made in the first two divisions.
First, the legislature has made a determination that certain injustices which may occur under the auspices of the statute of frauds are outweighed by benefits conferred by that statute. This the legislature has the right to do. I would defer to that body’s judgment.
Second, some difficulty has arisen because this court has not given recognition to the fact that the statute of frauds is not an appropriate defense in a case in which promissory estoppel is proposed as a consideration substitute. I would not now rely upon those faulty cases to erroneously emasculate the statute in cases where it is applicable: those involving a bilateral agreement.