interpreting Art. 419 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor of present Art. 21.26, V.A.C.C. P.
How later courts described this case
- interpreting Art. 419 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor of present Art. 21.26, V.A.C.C. P.
- opinion on appellant’s second motion for rehearing
- opinion on State’s motion for rehearing
- on State’s Motion for Rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
This Court has had this case under submission for more than a year, and five opinions have been written prior to the one we hand down today. One of the grounds for reversal set forth in the majority opinion is that complainant’s testimony was “equivocal, uncertain and conflicting.” In this connection I point out that prior to this opinion this Court found no difficulty in understanding complainant’s testimony.
A jury has heard the complainant testify, and they believed her testimony. Judge McAngus has heard her testify twice and has certified to this Court that she “testified truthfully on the main trial.”
I find myself in agreement with Mr. Justice Reed of the Supreme Court of the United States when he said in Stoll v. *201 Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 , 59 S.Ct. 134, 138 , 83 L.Ed. 104, 109 , “It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation.” In the case at bar, in my judgment, the “place to end” has long since passed.
I respectfully dissent to the granting of appellant’s second motion for rehearing.