interpreting Art. 419 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor of present Art. 21.26, V.A.C.C. P.
How later courts described this case
- interpreting Art. 419 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor of present Art. 21.26, V.A.C.C. P.
- opinion on appellant’s second motion for rehearing
- opinion on State’s motion for rehearing
- on State’s Motion for Rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
Our opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing is withdrawn. In addition to what we said originally, we call attention to the following cases: Lenzen v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 297 , 16 S.W.2d 234 ; Horton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 20 S.W.2d 1110 ; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 115 S.W.2d 685 ; Litchfield v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 201 , 179 S.W.2d 507 ; Bell v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 508 , 342 S.W.2d 444 ; and Newsom v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 372 S.W.2d 681 .
Each of the above cases is authority for the rule that any complaint of irregularity in the transfer of a case from the court where it was filed to the county court where it was tried should have been entered before announcing for trial. We find no complaint as to the order of transfer until the motion for new trial, and hence the rule announced by the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar and is controlling.
We noted in our original opinion that there was testimony tending to impeach the complainant and that many of her answers were equivocal or uncertain, but held the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that appellant obtained $10.00 from the complainant upon his false representation that he could get her boys out of the Juvenile Home.
Attached to appellant’s motion for rehearing is an affidavit of the complainant shown to have been made a few days after our original opinion affirming this conviction, which we deem sufficient, if true, to present the question of whether the conviction was obtained by the use of false evidence, known to be false by the police officer named in said affidavit. Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 ; Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 , 63 S.Ct. 177 , 87 L.Ed. 214 ; Curran v. State of Delaware, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 , 79 S.Ct. 355 , 3 L.Ed.2d 353 ; Jones v. Com. of Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.).
A federal claim of denial of due process of law having been presented, we have decided that a hearing should be held in the trial court while the appeal is pending and that the federal claim of denial of due process be determined prior to the final disposition of said appeal. Such procedure is consistent with the 1965 Code and Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 , 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 .
We suspend further consideration of appellant’s motion for rehearing for 90 days and direct that such hearing be had and that the evidence adduced, together with the trial court’s findings, be forwarded to this Court within such 90 days.