“Although the funds in the case before us had not changed hands, the money had been ‘raised’ and ‘commit[ted]’ by agreement for the purpose of gaining possession of cocaine.”
How later courts described this case
- “Although the funds in the case before us had not changed hands, the money had been ‘raised’ and ‘commit[ted]’ by agreement for the purpose of gaining possession of cocaine.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BENAVIDES, Judge,
concurring.
As Judge McCormick’s opinion points out, the applicable portion of of Section 4.052 of former Article 4476.15 (Texas Controlled Substances Act) of the Texas Controlled Substances Act provided in pertinent part that:
“(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally:
“(1) expends funds he knows are derived from the commission of an offense under Section 4.03(c), 4.031(c), 4.04(c), 4.041(c), 4.043(c), 4.043(c), 4.05(c) or 4.051(c) of this Act; or
“(2) finances or invests funds he knows or believes are intended to further the commission of an offense listed in Subdivision (a)(1) of this subsection.” Act of May 30, 1983, ch. 425, § 15, 1983 Tex. Gen.Laws 2361, 2391-2382.
As can be readily seen an offense under section 4.05(a)(2) can be committed by either financing or investing funds under the circumstances described therein.
The applicable portion of the court’s charge at the guilt-innocence stage properly allowed the jury to return a guilty verdict upon a finding that the appellants either did “finance or invest funds.”
Finance is defined as “to raise funds for or capital for” or “to furnish with necessary funds.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 463 (1985).
I believe that the facts clearly show that the appellants raised funds or furnished the necessary funds knowing and believing *93 that the funds were intended to further the commission of the offense of possession of cocaine as set out in the indictment. Clearly no transfer to Perez was necessary to show that appellants raised the funds or provided the funds. Accordingly the court of appeals erred in holding that a transfer to Perez was necessary in order to effectuate an illegal investment under Section 4.05(c)(2). Since the evidence clearly shows that the appellants did finance funds, the jury was authorized to return its verdict, irrespective of whether or not an actual transfer to Perez would have been necessary to prove an illegal investment had the indictment and charge merely referred to an investment rather than a financing or investment.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the decision to reverse the judgments of the court of appeals and to remand the causes for consideration of appellants’ remaining points of error.
MILLER, J., joins.