stating that “surprise and guile should, as far as possible, be removed from the arena in criminal trials just as it has in civil cases”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “surprise and guile should, as far as possible, be removed from the arena in criminal trials just as it has in civil cases”
- holding courts have inherent power to compel discovery of the State's evidence to protect a defendant's due process rights
- observing “that surprise and guile should, as far as possible, be removed from the arena in criminal trials just as it has in civil cases”
- physical evidence, scientific reports setting forth information obtained from that evidence, statements made to police by trial witnesses and copies of police investigatory reports
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BECKER, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result.
The majority reverses the trial court’s order to produce statements of witnesses secured by the State before trial. The trial court should also be affirmed on this issue. It is generally held a prosecutor cannot constitutionally withhold evidence favorable to the defendant. 7 A.L.R.3d 8 , 32-36; 33 A.L.R.2d 1421 , and later case service.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 , states: “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 , 87 S.Ct. 793, 811 , 17 L.Ed.2d 737, 760 , Justice Fortas states: “* * *. My point relates, not to the defendant’s discovery of the prosecution’s case for purposes of preparation or avoidance of surprise, which is dealt with in Rule 16, but with the State’s constitutional duty, as I see it, voluntarily to disclose material in its exclusive possession which is exonerative or helpful to the defense — which the State will not affirmatively use to prove guilt — and which it should not conceal.”
There is a basic inconsistency between recognition of the principle that suppression of evidence favorable to defendant violates due process and a refusal to allow a defendant to discover the evidence uncovered by the State. What we really say is: “The defendant can seek and obtain a new trial if by accident he discovers that favorable evidence has been suppressed.” It does little good to recognize a right but deny the tools to implement that right.
State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561 , 422 P.2d-125, 127 states: “* * *. Both prosecutors and the police, as public officers acting on behalf of the state, are sworn to uphold the law and are duty bound to protect the rights of the innocent as well as to prosecute the guilty. Their primary duty is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. Canon 5, Canons of Professional Ethics. A prosecutor who fails to reveal evidence that clearly would aid the accused’s defense would seem to have lost sight of his proper objective. Should his failure be a deliberate attempt to employ defendant’s unknow-ingness to the prosecution’s own advantage, his actions would become particularly reprehensible. * * *.
“A man faced with the possible prospects of losing his life or being subjected to an extended prison term should hot be denied, at the whim of the state, evidence which may be vital to his defense. A defendant’s right to a fair trial must not be regarded lightly. * *
I would agree, at least at this point, with the majority’s refusal to allow discovery of police reports containing the officer’s impressions. But here we are not talking about impressions. We are talking about statements made by witnesses. They should be produced, at least as to witnesses that the state has not indicated they intend to use.