The opinion
WALKER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to grant defendant’s motion for a protective order. However, for the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds the trial court applied an improper legal standard in determining who should have custody of Kayla.
I.
As the majority correctly points out, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1 mandates that “[a]ll such parts of the common law . . . which [have] not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete are ... in full force within this State.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1 (2001). However, in my opinion, the cumulative impact of the decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court and our own Supreme Court, along with the laws enacted by our legislature since Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711 , 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965), has been the abrogation of the common law principle that as between the mother and the father of an illegitimate child, the mother is presumed to have a superior right to custody.
In addition to the extensive case and statutory law cited in the majority opinion, I feel that our legislature has acknowledged such an abrogation in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2 . In a custody proceeding arising pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.1 et seq. as “[b]etween the mother and father, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of the child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2 (a) (2001) (emphasis added). This Court has consistently observed that §§ 50-13.1 et seq. were enacted in 1967 to “eliminate the conflicting and inconsistent statutes, which have caused pitfalls for litigants, and to bring all of the statutes relating to child custody and support together into one act.” In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 111 , 160 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1968); see also In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466 , 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969); and Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378 , 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972). “Had the Legislature intended G.S. 50-13.1 to apply to only those custody disputes involved in a divorce or separation, it would have expressly so provided, as it did in the prior statutes G.S. 50-13 and G.S. 50-16. The mere fact that G.S. 50-13.1 is found in the Chapter of the General Statutes governing *262 Divorce and Alimony is not sufficient to cause its application to be restricted to custody disputes involved in separation or divorce.” Oxendine v. Catawba County Dept. of Social Services, 303 N.C. 699, 706 , 281 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1981). Furthermore, this Court, in Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122 , 210 S.E.2d 88 (1974), specifically recognized the abrogation of the common law principle that the father of an illegitimate child is not entitled to visitation privileges absent consent of the mother. Conley, 24 N.C. App. at 123 , 210 S.E.2d at 89 .
Therefore, my review of the statutory and case law since Jolly leads me to conclude that any presumption of a superior right to custody afforded to the mother of an illegitimate child can only arise today upon a showing that the father has failed to accept the responsibilities associated with parenthood such that he is no longer entitled to the constitutional and statutory safeguards provided to a parent. Absent this showing, the trial court must confine itself to a determination of what is in the best interest of the child. See Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 61 , 550 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2001) (observing that in custody proceedings between biological or adoptive parents, or between two parties who are not natural parents, the trial court must determine custody based on the “best interest of the child” test).
The fact that plaintiff has failed to file the documents necessary to “legitimate” Kayla should be only one factor to consider in whether he has assumed the responsibilities of parenthood. To establish such a prerequisite for the enjoyment of constitutional protections simply raises form over substance and relegates plaintiff to the status of a third party despite the absence of any dispute concerning his paternity of Kayla. Indeed, on remand plaintiff would be well advised to seek leave of the trial court so that he might file a legitimation petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-10 . Presumably, defendant would not contest paternity and the parties, as the majority’s opinion suggests, would then be on equal footing with respect to Kayla’s custody.
The record clearly shows plaintiff has not relinquished his parental rights and the obligations required thereunder. Accordingly, I conclude the trial court correctly applied the “best interest of the child” test.
II.
Defendant also maintained that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding “primary legal custody” of Kayla to plaintiff. Our *263 appellate courts have consistently held that where competent evidence exists to support a trial court’s findings, a custody order supported by such findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616 , 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998); Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278 , 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); Church v. Church, 119 N.C. App. 436 , 458 S.E.2d 732 (1995); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571 , 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981). This is so because by seeing and hearing the parties first hand, the trial court is better positioned to “detect tenors, tones, and flavors” which are absent in a cold, impersonal record. Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 426 , 256 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1979). Nonetheless, “when the [trial] court fails to find facts so that this Court can determine that the order is adequately supported by competent evidence and the welfare of the child subserved, then the order entered thereon must be vacated and the case remanded for detailed findings of fact.” Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 238-39 , 158 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1967); see also Green, 54 N.C. App. at 573 , 284 S.E.2d at 173 .
This Court has vacated custody orders where the findings consisted of merely conclusory statements, ignored critical issues or were otherwise deficient such that we were unable to determine whether the custody award was in the best interest of the child. See e.g. Cantrell v. Wishon, 141 N.C. App. 340 , 540 S.E.2d 804 (2000); Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722 , 436 S.E.2d 856 (1993); Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73 , 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154 , 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); and Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286 , 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971). As this Court has aptly stated, the “[e]vidence must bolster the trial court’s findings, the findings must support the conclusions, and the conclusions must support the judgment.” Green, 54 N.C. App. at 575 , 284 S.E.2d at 174 .
In conducting my review of the custody order, I elect to review the following findings:
6. That in December, 1995, the Plaintiff moved to Oklahoma. When the child was born, the Plaintiff requested a paternity test and he voluntarily supported the child upon receiving a confirmation that he was the biological father of the child.
There is no competent evidence to support a finding that when Kayla was born, plaintiff requested a paternity test. Rather, the evidence clearly points to plaintiff as having agreed to submit to a paternity test at the behest of the Wake County Child Support Agency. It was only after the test that plaintiff acknowledged paternity.
*264 The trial court also found:
8. That the Defendant’s ex-boyfriend, Clea Johnson, who is father to the two (2) other minor children, has a relationship with the minor child, Kayla. The child has called him “daddy Clea” and that relationship has led to the confusion of the child.
9. That the defendant is presently involved with Moheeb Oona and this relationship has led to the confusion of the minor child.
These findings conclude that defendant’s relationships with other men have led to “the confusion” of Kayla. However, neither finding explains how Kayla is “confused” or details the impact these relationships have had on Kayla’s welfare.
With respect to Kayla’s care, the trial court found:
14. That the Defendant’s mother and grandmother get the child ready for school in the mornings, pick her [up] from daycare, feed her dinner, bathe her and put her to bed on a regular basis.
19. That the minor child is enrolled at Ernest Myatt daycare center and has been so enrolled since she was two (2) years old. From her birth until age two (2), the minor child was cared for by the Defendant’s grandmother.
While there is competent evidence to support a finding that defendant’s mother and grandmother have played a role in Kayla’s care, the evidence does not indicate, as these findings suggest, that defendant’s mother and grandmother have played such a dominant role to the exclusion of defendant. The findings also fail to consider defendant’s status as a single mother and the impact of her having received support payments from plaintiff in amounts less than what would have been required under our State’s child support guidelines. Rather, the findings only state:
22. That the Plaintiff paid voluntary child support to the Defendant upon the determination of paternity and there was no Order for Child Support entered. The parties agreed upon an amount of support and it was paid regularly and consistently by the Plaintiff.
The trial court next addressed defendant’s being away from Kayla and found:
*265 30. That the Defendant is not with the minor child a lot but rather she is at work or out with friends. The Defendant does go out 2-3 times per month on the weekends and the minor child is with the Defendant’s mother.
This statement is merely a conclusion concerning defendant’s lifestyle without relating how, if at all, Kayla’s best interest or welfare has been adversely affected.
The trial court does make specific reference to Kayla’s behavioral development in the following findings:
27. That the minor child, Kayla, is a happy, lively child but she does have some problems. While at the daycare, the child was hitting, biting, scratching other children. These behaviors are not unusual in and of themselves, however, what is unusual is that the daycare contacted Project Enlightenment to monitor the child’s progress.
28. That after the evaluation was conducted by Project Enlightenment, the Defendant did not follow through with informing herself about the results and she believed that the child was just going through a phase. The needs of the child were underestimated by the Defendant.
However, the evidence in the record shows that after further consultations with Kayla’s teachers, the Project Enlightenment consultant noted that her behavior had improved and closed the case. Moreover, the findings fail to identify the “needs” of Kayla, which were “underestimated” by defendant.
In some instances, the trial court alludes to defendant having failed to meet Kayla’s “needs.” For example, the trial court found:
29. That the minor child needs more attention than she is getting from the Defendant. The minor child needs more structure than she is getting from the Defendant. The Defendant does not offer the minor child a stable and consistent environment.
32. That the Defendant’s social life and work schedule has led to a hectic household which does not meet the needs of the child for stability and consistency.
Yet, these findings likewise do not detail what Kayla’s “needs” are or how they have not specifically been met by defendant.
*266 Thus, I conclude that these specific findings demonstrate that the trial court has failed to find facts so that this Court may satisfactorily determine whether its order awarding primary custody to plaintiff is adequately supported by competent evidence. Therefore, although I conclude the trial court applied the proper legal standard, I would vacate the custody order and remand the case to the trial court for more detailed findings.