The opinion
HUNTER, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find that extraordinary circumstances existed to allow surety relief from the judgment of forfeiture in this case.
However, I write separately to suggest that while our past jurisprudence has not established a requirement that the trial court grant relief from a forfeiture judgment when a surety returns a defendant after the judgment has been entered, such a factor should weigh heavily in the trial court’s consideration of extraordinary circumstances which entitle the surety to some relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8 (2003).
*828 Our courts have long recognized that “[t]he goal of the bonding system is the production of the defendantf.]” State v. Locklear, 42 N.C. App. 486, 489 , 256 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1979); see also State v. Pelley, 222 N.C. 684, 688 , 24 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1943) (stating “[t]he very purpose of the bond was ... to make the sureties responsible for the appearance of the defendant at the proper time”); State v. Coronel, 145 N.C. App. 237, 247 , 550 S.E.2d 561, 568 (2001) (stating “the court system’s paramount concern is ensuring the return of the criminal defendant for prosecution”).
Our system of bail bonds places the surety as custodian of the accused, and provides the surety great discretion in regaining custody in the event an accused escapes from such custody, in order to effectuate the purpose of returning the criminal defendant for prosecution. See State v. Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C. App. 45, 50 , 612 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2005) (citation omitted) (stating that a surety “ ‘may pursue [the accused] into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. ... It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner’ ”). Further, our courts have recognized that “[sjureties must be assured that if they expend money, time, and effort to recover criminal defendants, they have viable remedies for the return of forfeited bond money.” Coronel, 145 N.C. App. at 247 , 550 S.E.2d at 568 . Finally, our courts have stated that recovery efforts which result in the principal’s detention need not be dramatic to constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to grant relief from a forfeiture judgment. Locklear, 42 N.C. App. at 489 , 256 S.E.2d at 832 .
Given these established principles, a trial court should give great weight to the actual return of the accused into custody in considering relief from a forfeiture judgment, as failure to due so may discourage sureties from continued attempts to apprehend the accused and undermine the paramount concern of ensuring the return of the criminal defendant for prosecution. Pelley, 222 N.C. at 688, 24 S.E.2d at 638 . Return of the accused into custody within the 150 day period after entry of forfeiture is preferable, as recognized by the automatic set aside of a specific forfeiture for a return to custody in that time period. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5(b)(3) (2003). However, in order to effectuate the “foremost goal of the bond system” to produce the defendant in court in order to stand trial, Gonzalez-Fernandez, 170 N.C. App. at 50 , 612 S.E.2d at 152 , there must be some continued incentive to assure sureties (individuals as well as corporate) that a viable remedy for the return of forfeited bond money exists if they *829 expend money, time, and effort to recover criminal defendants. Coronel, 145 N.C. App. at 247 , 550 S.E.2d at 568 .