“In cases where ... property is conveyed without restriction to a charitable corporation ... the charitable intent of the donor is ascertained by reference to the charitable purposes of the donee.”
How later courts described this case
- “In cases where ... property is conveyed without restriction to a charitable corporation ... the charitable intent of the donor is ascertained by reference to the charitable purposes of the donee.”
- voluntary dissolution of historical society
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599 (1981)
The cases relied on by respondents either refer to instances where the charitable trust is no longer operating as such but has sought to make itself a proprietary venture (In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society (1953) 40 Cal.2d 852 [257 P.2d 1]), where the organization’s status as a tax-exempt charity has been questioned (Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Cal.2d 844 [264 P.2d 539]), where the charitab…
The opinion
CARTER, J.
I dissent from the order denying appellant’s petition for rehearing, and in view of the contention of appellant in said petition that the effect of the decision of this court is to deprive it of its property without due process of law, I am constrained to comment on this contention.
The record in this case presents one of the most outrageous examples of legalized larceny which has come under my observation.
The Pioneer Society was organized as an unincorporated association; the evidence shows clearly, and without contradiction, that it was intended to be, and was, a purely social organization. As such an unincorporated association and social organization, it had the right, upon dissolution, to distribute its assets among its members.
The record discloses that Pioneer has acted with the utmost good faith throughout. In the first instance, Pioneer sought a judicial determination of its charitable, or social, status. The first judicial determination was that it was a nonprofit, non charitable organization. A later judicial determination by the same court held it to be a charitable organization. Pioneer then sought to abandon its dissolution proceedings and, in accordance with the last judicial determination, carry on as a charitable organization. This it has not been permitted *875 to do. A majority of this court has declared that Pioneer is a charitable organization and that it may not be permitted to correct its so-called deviation from its articles of incorporation ; that its assets must be turned over to a successor trustee— the Historical Society. As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion, this is a clear violation of the statutory provisions involved, which permit corrective action by a charitable organization which has deviated from its articles. Even if Pioneer is a charitable organization (which I am firmly convinced it is not) it has the right to abandon its dissolution proceedings and correct any deviation from its articles of incorporation. To refuse, to permit such corrective action is, in my opinion, to deprive Pioneer of its property without due process of law under both the federal and state Constitutions.
With respect to corporations, this court is empowered only to apply the statutory law of the state as it was written by the Legislature; it is not empowered to ignore the statutory provisions relating to corporations and effect a distribution of corporate assets as its collective whim may dictate.
For the reasons stated herein, and in my dissenting opinion, T would grant a rehearing and reverse the judgment.