“[T]he lower tier of equal protection analysis .. . merely requires that distinctions which are drawn by a challenged statute or action bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate government interest.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he lower tier of equal protection analysis .. . merely requires that distinctions which are drawn by a challenged statute or action bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate government interest.”
- relying almost entirely on Federal Equal Protection jurisprudence in analyzing a claim under Article I, Section 19
- “The gist of standing is whether there is a justiciable con troversy being litigated among adverse parties with substantial interest affected so as to bring forth a clear articulation of the issues before the court.”
- “[W]here legislation or governmental action affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because the traditional political processes may have broken down.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Carlton
dissenting.
I join in Justice Exum’s dissent. It is inconceivable to me that our annexation statutes were intended to permit the kind of action taken by Fayetteville in this case. It is patently preposterous to allow annexation by referendum where there are no “qualified voters” to vote.
I am in further disagreement with the majority opinion. I find no incompatibility between plaintiffs’ desire to vote in an annexation proceeding and the responsibility of government to insure the integrity of the franchise to vote. It is true that modern corporations “[represent] a variety of interests and positions within [their] framework.” It does not follow, however, that a corporation cannot speak with a single voice. A corporate board can decide how the corporation will cast its vote in an annexation referendum the same way it makes any major policy decision — by a vote of the board of directors.
The majority also seems concerned that corporations can be residents of a number of jurisdictions and that multiple subsidiaries would present the opportunity for multiple voting. It is enough to say that that possibility does not appear in this case. Denial of the right to vote should not be predicated upon the fear of potential abuse. Such abuse can be prevented by appropriate legislation.
In other words, I jüst do not agree with the apparent maj ority concern that practical voting procedure problems should preclude our corporate citizens from a voice in annexation elections. I would hold that the denial of their right to vote in annexation referenda is a violation of equal protection of the laws.