United States v. Introcaso

ACKERMAN, District Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join the majority’s opinion insofar as it affirms Introcaso’s conviction on count two, for possession of unregistered destructive devices. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that the sentence imposed on Introcaso was not unreasonable. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse Introcaso’s conviction as to count one, possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. For the reasons stated by the Second Circuit in United States v. Tribunella, 749 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.1984), I would conclude that the antique-firearm exception does not apply in this case and would affirm Introcaso’s conviction on this count.

As the majority suggests, in enacting the National Firearms Act, Congress had several purposes, including not placing undue burdens on museums and gun collectors and decreasing the violent use of guns. Tribunella, 749 F.2d at 109-11 . However, the mere fact that Congress had multiple and perhaps competing purposes does not automatically render the statute ambiguous. As the court in Tribunella reasoned, the Act’s restrictive definition of antique “in terms of the type of ammunition the weapon could use reveals that Congress’s overriding concern was for decreasing the violent use of guns.” Id. at 110 . Thus, Congress intended “to exclude from regulation only those weapons that are unlikely to be usable for violent acts.” Id. Accordingly, there is no need to resort to the rule of lenity: The Second Circuit’s reasonable construction of § 5845(g) as “excluding from the definition of antique any firearm for which any usable ammunition is readily available in ordinary channels of commerce,” id. at 109, comports with the statute’s plain text and congressional intent. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion regarding Introcaso’s conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm.