holding that probable cause requires only a fair probability that the suspect committed a crime and does not demand evidence sufficient to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- holding that probable cause requires only a fair probability that the suspect committed a crime and does not demand evidence sufficient to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
- reviewing the record and determining officers had probable cause to make an arrest for aggravated battery, even though they in fact made the arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery
- defining “probable cause” as possessing information leading a person of ordinary care and prudence to honestly believe individual is guilty of crime
- “[P]robable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the Court. In my view, it is not proper to validate an arrest after the fact for a crime that was not the basis for the arrest.
First, I read I.C. § 19-603(6) to allow a warrantless arrest for a domestic disturbance only “at the scene.” Even if it were ambiguous, however, this would require that it be strictly construed in the defendant’s favor. State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 , 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1993).
Second, I cannot accept that an appellate court may objectively review the facts, after the fact, to find probable cause for an arrest that was not made or even contemplated by the officers. I find Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.1969) to be unpersuasive. In Klingler , the Eighth Circuit interpreted South Dakota arrest law. I would prefer to interpret Idaho arrest law without deferring to a federal court’s interpretation of another state’s law.
Third, the arrest of Julian for a crime of which he was not informed, clearly violates I.C. § 19-608.