holding that probable cause requires only a fair probability that the suspect committed a crime and does not demand evidence sufficient to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- holding that probable cause requires only a fair probability that the suspect committed a crime and does not demand evidence sufficient to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
- reviewing the record and determining officers had probable cause to make an arrest for aggravated battery, even though they in fact made the arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery
- defining “probable cause” as possessing information leading a person of ordinary care and prudence to honestly believe individual is guilty of crime
- “[P]robable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LANSING, J. Pro Tem.,
concurs.
B. The Arresting Officer Informed Julian Of The Cause Of His Arrest As Required by I.C. § 19-608.
Julian asserts, and the district court held, that if his underlying arrest is validated under a different charge than that for which he was originally cited, he was not informed of “the cause of the arrest” as required by I.C. § 19-608. We do not agree.
In pertinent part I.C. § 19-608 states that “[t]he person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it ...” It is worthy to note that the statute requires that the person being arrested be informed of the “cause of the arrest,” not the charge for which he might eventually be made to answer. Compare I.C. § 19-613 and I.C.R. 5 (stating when arrested persons must be informed of the “charges” against them). To read “cause of the arrest” as what the defendant may be charged with would require an arresting officer to inform the person of every possible crime for which probable cause might be said to exist.
Further, there can be little doubt that Julian was informed that the reason for his arrest was the alleged battery committed upon his wife. Cf., Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 667 , 710 P.2d 566, 577 (1985) (using “reason for the arrest” and “cause of the arrest” interchangeably). The fact that Julian was subsequently charged with a related crime, albeit a different charge than that for which he was cited, does not vitiate the deputies’ original compliance with the statute at the time of arrest. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court that Julian was not informed of the cause of his arrest.
WALTERS, LANSING and DRESCHER, JJ. Pro Tem., concur.
V.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Julian’s arrest was not unlawful. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order suppressing evidence seized from Julian following his arrest and remand for further proceedings.
We also reverse the conclusion of the district court that Julian was not informed of the “cause of the arrest” as required by I.C. § 19-608.
The case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
WALTERS, LANSING and DRESCHER, JJ. Pro Tem., concur.