“During the direct examination of a co-defendant, a prosecutor may elicit testimony regarding the co-defendant’s plea agreement, and may actually introduce the plea agreement into evidence for purposes which include, but are not necessarily limited to: (1
How later courts described this case
- “During the direct examination of a co-defendant, a prosecutor may elicit testimony regarding the co-defendant’s plea agreement, and may actually introduce the plea agreement into evidence for purposes which include, but are not necessarily limited to: (1
- improper to admit plea agreement indicating the state will request safe placement for witnesses because it implies that the state agrees with witnesses' claims that testifying truthfully would put them in danger
- collecting cases and other secondary authority showing the limitations on the prosecution's ability to introduce a co-defendant’s plea agreement
- collecting cases in which courts have allowed the prosecution to offer plea agreements on direct examination of a cooperating co-defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MAYNARD, Justice,
I agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the co-defendants’ plea agreements without redacting the language that neither co-defendant would be placed in the same correctional facility as Mr. Swims. However, I disagree with the majority that the challenged language constitutes reversible error.
The language at issue states: “In consideration of the foregoing, [the] State will agree to request a safe placement for defendant in a correctional facility physically separate from that where codefendant Jessie Swims is housed.” The majority concludes that “[w]ithout the insertion in the plea agreements of the qualifying word “if,” the plea agreements became impermissible substantive evidence of Mr. Swims’ guilt.” This conclusion defies good old-fashioned common sense. Any reasonable person who reads this language would understand it to mean that in the event Mr. Swims is convicted of the charged crime and incarcerated, he will not be placed with his co-defendants.
Significantly, the language at issue was never discussed in front of the jury during trial. Further, there is no indication that the jury was not instructed properly concerning presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving guilt. Finally, substantial evidence of Mr. Swims’ guilt was presented at trial. In light of all this, I simply find it incredible that this one sentence buried in a plea agreement affected the outcome of the *275 Accordingly, I dissent. trial. 1
. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that another provision of Mr. Young’s plea agreement constituted plain error.