Opinion

Reno v. Baird

  • 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 499
  • 18 Cal. 4th 640
  • 98 Daily Journal DAR 7769
  • 957 P.2d 1333
  • 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,450
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 16, 1998
Status
Published
Author
Brown
On the bench
Chin, Mosk, Brown
Cited by
343 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.8%

concluding that the plaintiff could not sue her individual supervisor for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, since the public policy on which her action was based was that of the FEHA and FEHA did not create a cause of action against individual supervisors

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that the plaintiff could not sue her individual supervisor for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, since the public policy on which her action was based was that of the FEHA and FEHA did not create a cause of action against individual supervisors
  • explaining that FEHA treats discrimination and harassment 27 “differently,” as “only ‘an employer’” can be sued for discrimination, but “an employer 28 . . . or any other person” may be liable for harassing an employee” (emphasis added)
  • finding 4 that harassment includes “conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct 5 presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for 6 other personal motives”
  • holding that supervisors may not be sued individually under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, and stating that this holding "also applies to common law actions for wrongful discharge”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Leek v. Cooper, 194 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2011)

    Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ agreement with the conclusion that liability under the statutes in question extends only to employers, they argue that the policy reasons cited in Reno and Janken are inapplicable here.
    California Court of AppealApr 15, 2011Read it

The opinion

BROWN, J.

I fully concur in the majority holding “that individuals who do not themselves qualify as employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged discriminatory acts.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 663.) I write separately with respect to plaintiff’s Tameny cause of action {Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]) to reiterate my view that under no circumstances should the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) serve as the predicate public policy for the common law tort of wrongful discharge. {Stevenson v. *666 Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 911-925 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) “FÉHA is a comprehensive statute that carefully balances complementary administrative and judicial remedies not only to make whole victims of discrimination in the workplace, but also to penalize these unlawful business practices and prevent their recurrence. Permitting a parallel common law tort claim puts courts in the untenable position of using a legislative declaration of public policy as a touchstone to justify duplicative remedies that ultimately can serve only to frustrate legislative intent. In addition, recognizing a FEHA-based cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy contradicts the rationale of this exception to the at-will employment doctrine. When the Legislature has provided an adequate statutory remedy to fully protect the interests of both the employee and the public, the courts have neither reason nor need to intercede.” (Id. at p. 912.)

Baxter, J., concurred.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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