finding in an action for libel by innuendo that the “implications deprecatory to plaintiff” were “mere opinion”
How later courts described this case
- finding in an action for libel by innuendo that the “implications deprecatory to plaintiff” were “mere opinion”
- “speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable to avoid a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights”
- "A statement regarding (1) a public official’s business, social, or political affiliations, and (2
- explaining statements of opinion are not 23 actionable
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the opinion and in the judgment as to the second, third and fifth causes of action, but I dissent from the order permitting leave to amend the sixth cause of action. The further prolongation of this litigation would be as misguided as its origin. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2; Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 532 P.2d 116 ].)
The majority conclude that the plaintiffs might possibly identify one of the several hundred Does sued as defendants and thus establish a conspiracy to slander. I suggest that since plaintiffs have not proposed to further amend their complaint to name any additional defendants at any time after the lawsuit was filed in 1979, an ineluctable conclusion follows that they are unable to do so at this late date.
Defendants filed a general demurrer and it is that general demurrer on which the court is ruling. In many circumstances sustaining a special demurrer might justify a belated opportunity to amend, but we have found, as I read the majority opinion, that no cause of action has been stated. Naming an identifiable live human being in place of a fictitious Doe, even if it can be done, will add nothing to the substance of the complaint.
As I stated recently in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Deas v. Knapp (1981) 29 Cal.3d 69, 80 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 823 , 623 P.2d 775 ], there comes a time when the finality of litigation is almost as important as the decision therein. In the preservation of the free exercise of speech, writing and the political function, the early termination of this lawsuit is highly desirable. We should discourage attempts to recover through the judicial process what has been lost in the political process.
Bird, C. J., and Brown (Gerald), J.,* concurred.
Petitioners’ applications for a rehearing were denied July 15, 1981. Brown (Gerald), J.,* and Cologne, J.,* participated therein. Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., and Brown (Gerald), J.,* were of the opinion that the applications should be granted as to court’s action on sixth cause of action.