“Denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it simply allows an action to proceed and will not seriously impair any right of defendants that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “Denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it simply allows an action to proceed and will not seriously impair any right of defendants that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
- “[A] state has a manifest interest in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEELMAN, Judge
concurring in the result.
I fully concur in the result reached by the majority in this case, and particularly with the holding that under N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2) the court was not required to make findings of fact in the absence of a request by the parties. In such a case, “it will be presumed that the judge, upon proper evidence, found facts sufficient to support the judgment.” J.M. Thompson Co. v. Doral Mfg. Co., 72 N.C. App. 419, 424 , 324 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1985) (citation omitted). Our analysis is limited to whether the presumed findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and if so, they are conclusive on appeal despite evidence to the contrary. Id. at 424 , 324 S.E.2d at 913 ; see also 2 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 52-4, at 200-201 (2d ed. 1995). In the instant case, there is evidence in the record to support the presumed findings of fact by the court, and its denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be affirmed.