Powell v. Seay

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING

SIMMS, Justice:

Following this Court’s promulgation of an opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of The United States decided Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 , 44 U.S.L.W. 4250 , which was a case involving the issue of immunity of a California District Attorney, and more particularly, the scope and applicability of immunity against an action brought under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

We find Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, supportive of the conclusion reached in the prior opinion of this Court.

In Imbler, Mr. Justice Powell wrote:

“The function of a prosecutor that most often invites a common-law tort action is his decision to initiate a. prosecution, as this may lead to a suit for malicious prosecution if the State’s case misfires. The first American case to address the question of a prosecutor’s amendability to such an action was Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 (1896). The complaint charged that a local prosecutor without probable cause added the plaintiff’s name to a grand jury true bill after the grand jurors had refused to indict him, with the result that the plaintiff was arrested and forced to appear in court repeatedly before the charge finally was nolle prossed. Despite allegations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dismissed the action on the ground that the prosecutor was absolutely immune.” “The Griffith view on prosecutorial immunity became the clear majority rule on the issue. * * * ”

****** “The common-law rule of immunity is thus well settled. We now must determine whether the same considerations of public policy that underline the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983. We think they do.” (E.A.)

“If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of § 1983 suits would undermine performance of his duties no less than would the threat of common-law suits for malicious prosecution. A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit, for damages. Such suits could be expected with some fre *168 quency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State’s advocate. Cf. Bradley v. Fisher, [ 80 U.S. 335 ], 13 Wall. [335] at 348, 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. [547], at 554, 87 S. Ct. [1213] at 1217 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ], Further, if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.”

“Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to the honest prosecutor. * * *” (E.A.)

* * * * * *

“The affording of only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor also could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system. * * * ”

The last paragraph of the Imbler opinion delineates the scope of the Court’s holding, wherein it is stated:

“ * * * We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate. We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” (E.A.)

If we assume for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, filed in the trial court that all allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition are true, the petition alleges that petitioner herein “maliciously and without reasonable and justifiable cause, made a sworn complaint in Cause No. CR-75-73, Seminole County, Wewoka Division, Oklahoma” and that petitioner “continued to charge and prosecuted W.C. (Bill) Mayfield with the'-aforementioned alleged crime.” The filing of a criminal complaint and the prosecution thereof, without question, fall within the penumbra of quasi-judicial functions, as mentioned in Imbler, supra, and therefore, petitioner, as a matter of law, is immune from suit, either at common-law, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . We further conclude, under Imbler, supra, that such a determination may be properly made at the pleading stage.

Rehearing is therefore Denied.

WILLIAMS, C. J., and BERRY, LAVENDER and BARNES, JJ. concur.

HODGES, V. C. J., and IRWIN, J., dissent.