Powell v. Seay

DOOLIN, Justice

(dissenting):

We agree with the majority that if it is shown that a district attorney is acting within the scope of his authority and in pursuance of his official duties, he is immune from civil liability for his acts. This is clearly supported by the cases cited. However, believing the action taken by the majority to be premature, we dissent to the issuance of the writ for two alternative reasons.

First, we believe the petition does indeed state a cause of action, more specifically under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983; and second, in the alternative a claim that a petition does not state a cause of action should be attacked by demurrer not by a refusal to answer interrogatories.

Does the petition state a cause of action? Contrary to the opinion of the majority, we believe that it does. The allegations contained in the petition state a cause of action unless a district attorney is absolutely immune from civil liability. But a district attorney’s immunity as a quasi-judicial officer is not absolute but qualified. Although citizens have been protected from the abuse of power by a government official by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, cases cited by the majority prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not controlling. Section § 1983, as quoted in the majority opinion, gives a cause.of action where none might have existed before. It gives a right of action to private citizens when any official acting under the color of law oversteps his authority. It is designed to encompass all governmental officers and does not exempt district attorneys. The cases cited under this section are legion. If a government official goes beyond that which he is authorized to do he sheds his cloak of immunity.

In Robichaud v. Ronan, 350 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) the Court said when a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other than quasi-judicial such as a police officer, he is no longer immune. If immunities are too broadly granted to prosecutors without consideration of the nature of their alleged misdeeds and the reason for immunity, then § 1983 becomes subject to circumspection if not emasculation. See also Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).

Even prior to the enactment of § 1983 there is authority that a district attorney sheds his immunity if he is not acting on complaints sworn out by others but rather initiates the complaint himself and causes a party to be arrested on a charge that he knows to be false. See Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 641 , 222 P. 318 (1924); Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82 , 158 N.W. 182 (1916). Such action is not within the scope of his duties. It is an abuse of power under color of state law.

Plaintiff’s petition alleges “Defendant maliciously with no justifiable cause and with intent to injure W. C. (Bill) Merry- *166 field in his reputation and occupation of Sheriff of Seminole County, Oklahoma, and to bring W. C. (Bill) Merryfield into public disgrace continued to charge and prosecuted W. C. (Bill) Merryfield with the aforementioned alleged crime.” Such alleged action is not within the scope of the duties of a district attorney. This allegation, if proved to be true, creates a cause of action as covered by § 1983.

Petition further alleges that one of District Attorney’s witnesses was being-investigated for perjury. If true, such a fact could create a cause of action as covered by § 1983, under respondeat superior.

Petition further alleges that defendant had no reasonable or justifiable cause for bringing the above charge against Merry-field and that Merryfield was acquitted of the charges. If true, again plaintiff may have stated a cause of action under § 1983.

If a district attorney files charges on his own, when he knows there has been no criminal act committed upon which to base these charges, there can be little doubt that he has acted beyond the scope of his authority and is subject to a damage suit. If a petition so alleges it states a cause of action. If it does not, an adequate procedure is available through a demurrer or a motion for summary judgment.

This brings us to our second point of departure from the opinion of the majority. There was no demurrer filed. The District Attorney simply refused to answer interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff. This is not the proper method to attack a petition. Cases under § 1983 have uniformly allowed a plaintiff to amend his petition; here plaintiff will not be given that privilege. Our Oklahoma statutes are specific. The trial court may order a party to answer interrogatories and a party may be held in indirect contempt if he refuses. 12 O.S. 1971 § 549(c). The District Attorney is given no more right to refuse than a private citizen. If we permit a district attorney to act in this cavalier manner, do we also give a private citizen the right to refuse to answer interrogatories if he believes the complaint to be faulty? I think not. By the majority opinion, that right belongs exclusively to judicial and quasi-judicial officers.

We agree that a petition for damages for malicious prosecution by a district attorney must allege such type of abuse of office. The complaint must be specific, but it is not necessary in an action brought under § 1983 to enumerate each specific act. This would be to plead evidence. Since § 1983 is remedial legislation it must be given liberal construction. An action under § 1983 must not be dismissed at the pleading stage unles it appears to be a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any stated facts which might be proved in support of his claim. Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1968). Otherwise we are giving a district attorney carte blanche to initiate as well as prosecute an action against anyone for any reason without just cause, with no fear of reprisal and with no redress in the citizen.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S. Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) involved a suit against the Governor of Ohio, Adjutant General and others by the personal representatives of the estates of the students who were killed on the campus of Kent State University. The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction before an answer was filed because it felt the defendants were being sued in their official capacities. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the issue was not whether a plaintiff would ultimately prevail, even though it might appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery was very remote and unlikely, but whether the claimant was entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would *167 entitle him to relief. The acts of a government officer do not have the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights. These acts are reviewable through the judicial power granted by virtue of § 1983. The Court further held the district court had acted prematurely and hence erroneously in dismissing the complaints as it did, without affording claimants any opportunity to establish their claims.

This is the identical situation here. Plaintiff has had no opportunity to present evidence of his claims. We are not unmindful that' the suit here is against a district attorney, not the governor. But to hold this office is clothed with a higher degree of immunity than that of the Governor of a Sovereign State is to do an injustice to the intent and meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The erosion of § 1983 has begun with the majority decision.

We express no opinion as to the validity of plaintiff’s claims or as to his chances of prevailing. We would simply hold that to dismiss the cause at this point before plaintiff has .had an opportunity to consider the answers to the interrogatories and if necessary amend his petition or prove his claims is premature and the writ should be denied.

I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice HODGES concurs in the views herein expressed.