stating that, “[f]or standing in a declaratory judgment action, there must be a present, actual controversy at the time the pleading requesting declaratory relief is filed” (citing Sharpe, 317 N.C. at 584 , 347 S.E.2d at 29 )
How later courts described this case
- stating that, “[f]or standing in a declaratory judgment action, there must be a present, actual controversy at the time the pleading requesting declaratory relief is filed” (citing Sharpe, 317 N.C. at 584 , 347 S.E.2d at 29 )
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Judge Greene
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the WSWPA is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it “lacks meaningful guiding standards.” A statute enacted by the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, Wayne County Citizens Ass’n v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm’rs, 328 N.C. 24, 29 , 399 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (1991), and the burden is on the person challenging the statute to show it is unconstitutional. Mobile Home Sales v. Tomlinson, 276 N.C. 661, 669 , 174 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1970).
As stated in Adams v. Department of N.E.R. and Everett v. Department of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683 , 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978), in proper instances a “modem legislature” must be able to delegate “ ‘a limited portion of its legislative powers [sic]’ to administrative bodies which are equipped to adapt legislation ‘to complex conditions involving numerous details with which the Legislature cannot deal directly.’ ” Id. at 697 , 249 S.E.2d at 410 (quoting Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, 265 N.C. 109, 114 , 143 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1965); Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52, 60 , 74 S.E.2d 310, 316 (1953)). Such delegation must be accompanied by “adequate guiding standards” that “need be only ‘as specific as the circumstances permit.’ ” Id. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Pine Island, 265 N.C. at 115 , 143 S.E.2d at 323 ). Furthermore,
*718 [w]hen there is an obvious need for expertise in the achievement of legislative goals the General Assembly is not required to lay down a detailed agenda covering every conceivable problem which might arise in the implementation of the legislation. It is enough if general policies and standards have been articulated which are sufficient to provide direction to an administrative body possessing the expertise to adapt the legislative goals to varying circumstances.
Id.
In a complex society “replete with ever changing and more technical problems, [the General Assembly] simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” I Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 (3d ed. 1994); see 1 Jacob A. Stein, et al., Administrative Law § 3.03[4], at 3-96 (1993) (“the delegation doctrine has not invalidated legislation predicated on the vaguest of standards, even when the legislation’s standards are virtually nonexistent”). Our Supreme Court has stated that “[djetailed standards are not required” and the “modern tendency is to be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to administrative agencies ... to ease the administration of laws as the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increases.” Commissioner of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 402 , 269 S.E.2d 547, 563 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980).
The WSWPA’s “Policy Statement” states that the statute “provides for a cooperative program of water supply watershed management and protection.” N.C.G.S. § 143-214.5(a) (1993). Furthermore, the statute mandates that the Environmental Management Commission (Commission) “shall adopt rules for the classification of water supply watersheds” designed to “protect surface water supplies by (i) controlling development density, (ii) providing for performance-based alternatives to development density controls that are based on sound engineering principles, or (iii) a combination of both (i) and (ii).” N.C.G.S. § 143-214.5(a), (b). The question is whether these guidelines are adequate.
The Commission, authorized to implement the WSWPA, was created to “promulgate rules” to protect, preserve, and enhance North Carolina’s water and air resources. N.C.G.S. § 143B-282(a) (1993). Before enacting the WSWPA, North Carolina used a different *719 water classification system which was also designed to protect water supplies and which the Commission controlled and implemented. See Brandon Bordeaux, Comment, Legal Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Water Supply Watershed Protection Act of 1989 and the Hyde Bill, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1279 , 1283-84 (1994). Based on its prior work classifying water supplies, the Commission has the experience and knowledge to design and implement a water supply watershed classification system without detailed findings and requirements from the General Assembly. Furthermore, the WSWPA must be read in the context of Article 21, titled “Water and Air Resources,” to which it is an amendment and which concerns itself with the protection, preservation and enhancement of our water and air resources. Article 21 sets out a declaration of public policy, including the achievement and maintenance of a “total environment of superior quality.” N.C.G.S. § 143-211 (1993). In fulfilling its duties, the Commission has the responsibility of preserving and developing the State’s natural resources “in the best interest of all its citizens.” Id. This standard applies to the Commission’s duty of protecting North Carolina’s air and water resources, part of which includes the job of classifying water supply watersheds.
Although the WSWPA does not have detailed guiding standards, such detail is not necessary. The General Assembly has articulated guiding standards that are as “specific as the circumstances permit” and I would hold the WSWPA to be a constitutional delegation of legislative powers. I would therefore affirm the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to the State agencies on the County’s cross-claim.