The opinion
Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with respect to the affirmance of summary judgment to the county. With respect to defendant Mastín, I concur in the judgment because I am bound by Banks v. Patton, 202 Ga. App. 168 (2) ( 413 SE2d 744 ) (1991). However, the law expressly conditions the exercise of certain driving privileges, by drivers of law enforcement vehicles in emergencies, upon the activation of an audible signal and a flashing or revolving blue light. OCGA § 40-6-6 (c). The plain meaning of this is that if the prerequisites are not met, there are no such privileges and the safety regulations are not suspended. The purpose of mandating both audible and visual warnings obviously is to provide a proven modicum of protection to the life, limb, and property of those traveling on the highway. Appropriating the privileges when not meeting the mandatory conditions is a violation of the law. OCGA § 40-6-6 (e).
Considering the known effect of driving without an audible signal, it should be a question of fact whether an officer who does so and in addition sets aside the normal safety regulations described in sub *6 section (b), thereby acts with reckless disregard for the safety of others or only negligently. The higher degree of culpability should depend on the circumstances and the jury’s evaluation of them.
Decided December 19, 1994
Reconsideration denied January 4, 1995
Lee, Black, Scheer & Hart, Steven E. Scheer, Christopher L. Rouse, for appellants.
Woodall & MacKenzie, John T. Woodall, Peter A. Giusti, for appellees.