Opinion

John Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC

  • 668 F.3d 843
  • 18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1316
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3344
  • 2012 WL 539373
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Feb 21, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Merritt
On the bench
Merritt, Moore, Mays
Cited by
295 cases

stating that “the district court in its discretion may properly choose whether to exercise § 1367(a) jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims; however, such a decision is ‘purely discretionary’” (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)))

How later courts described this case

  • stating that “the district court in its discretion may properly choose whether to exercise § 1367(a) jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims; however, such a decision is ‘purely discretionary’” (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 , 639–40 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)))
  • explaining that the court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is “purely discretionary”
  • “The new (2004) [FLSA] regulations ... establish that employment agreements are no longer the relevant starting point for whether an employee is paid on a salary basis. The question is therefore not what [an employee] was owed under his employment agreement; rather, the question is what compensation [the employee] actually received.”
  • “Having concluded that the FLSA claim was not viable, the district court did not address the arguments with respect to Calamunci's status as an employer and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice because it decided it “lack [ed] a basis to exercise subject matter jurisdiction” over the state-law claims.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I agree with the court that the “exemption” issue should be decided after the defendant describes the issue in an affirmative defense and after further proceedings. That was not done here. The district court decided the case only on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We do not know what the facts are. It may be that the parties entered into a new agreement based on the company’s cash *851 position. We do not know. I would not speculate on how the exempt status statutory language and regulations should be interpreted for various fact patterns. Nor would I indicate a view of what the result would be if the company ran out of cash and so informed its executive employees who decided to stay on the job to see if the company could get over its problems.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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