holding that a defendant’s consultation with his attorney was a “crucial factor” in determining that the defendant validly consented to a search of his hotel suite
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant’s consultation with his attorney was a “crucial factor” in determining that the defendant validly consented to a search of his hotel suite
- finding prior illegal "protective sweep" of hotel suite did not taint defendant's consent to search because defendant "had been permitted to consult with his attorney immediately prior to consenting to the search"
- noting that "there were no threats or misrepresentations made which would have induced [the defendant's] consent" (emphasis supplied)
- “lack of a significant intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the district court properly considered the relevant factors in deciding that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal police conduct for fourth amendment purposes. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-18 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-59 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1979). I see no reason to disturb the district court’s determination, or to require a new consideration of the evidence. I would therefore affirm.