holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case
How later courts described this case
- holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case
- concluding that it is "reasonable" for an arresting officer to search "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon" because "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested"
- holding that where a search is conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest, “[t]here is ample justification … for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
- explaining when an arrest is made “[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’— construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969), overruled in part by Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332
Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 21, 200913 citing opinionsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported abrogated by Davis v. United States, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Id. at 224-25, 94 S.Ct. 467 (citing Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).
Reported abrogated on other grounds by New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) — not on the Supreme Court's list
395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”), abrogated on other ground by New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
Questioned by United States v. Watt, 309 F. Supp. 329 (1970)
Consequently, the Chimel decision is inapplicable and we must turn to other sources against which to measure the legality of the present search.
Questioned by State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100 (2005)
The Court therefore left "to future consideration the question of the continued viability of [its] analysis of the scope of the Chimel exception as expressed in Welsh.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (1979)
While the facts of Chimel are clearly distinguishable from the present case, the rationale used by the Court is controlling.
Distinguished by State v. Tomey, 163 W. Va. 578 (1979)
which allows the arresting officer to search the “grabbable” area in which the defendant “might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence,” 395 U.S. at 763, is inapposite since there was no danger of a weapon being grabbed from the closed suitcase.
Distinguished by Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557 (1976)
The fact that the rules announced in Chimel are inapplicable to searches of automobiles based upon probable cause {id., at p. 764, fn. 9 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 694]; People v. Freeny (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 20, 29 [112 Cal.Rptr. 33]; see fn. 5, ante) cannot be interpreted as meaning that no spatial limitations are applicable to automobiles.
Distinguished by United States v. Castellana, 369 F. Supp. 376 (1973)
Thus, the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), is inapplicable.
The opinion
*769 Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with these remarks concerning a factor to which the Court has not alluded.
The only thing that has given me pause in voting to overrule Harris and Rabinowitz is that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement. We simply do not know the extent to which cities and towns across the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly expanded warrant system which will be required by today’s decision; nor can we say with assurance that in each and every local situation, the warrant requirement plays an essential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, one is now faced with the dilemma, envisioned in my separate opinion in Ker, 374 U. S., at 45-46 , of choosing between vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns, long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment before Mapp and Ker came on the books, or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights in the interest of leaving the States at least some elbow room in their methods of criminal law enforcement. No comparable dilemma exists, of course, with respect to the impact of today’s decision within the federal system itself.
This federal-state factor has not been an easy one for me to resolve, but in the last analysis I cannot in good conscience vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law.
I add only that this case, together with Benton v. Maryland, post, p. 784, North Carolina v. Pearce, ante, p. 711, and Simpson v. Rice, ante, p. 711, all decided *770 today, serve to point up, as few other cases have, the profound changes that the “incorporation doctrine” has wrought both in the workings of our federal system and upon the adjudicative processes of this Court.