Opinion

Chimel v. California

  • 395 U.S. 752
  • 89 S. Ct. 2034
  • 23 L. Ed. 2d 685
  • 1969 U.S. LEXIS 1166
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 23, 1969
Status
Published
Author
Harlan
On the bench
Stewakt, Harlan, White, Black
Cited by
5,373 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.6%

Reported overruled in part by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list

holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case

How later courts described this case

  • holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case
  • concluding that it is "reasonable" for an arresting officer to search "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon" because "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested"
  • holding that where a search is conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest, “[t]here is ample justification … for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
  • explaining when an arrest is made “[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’— construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported overruled in part by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969), overruled in part by Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332
    Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 21, 200913 citing opinionsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Reported abrogated by Davis v. United States, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    Id. at 224-25, 94 S.Ct. 467 (citing Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 16, 20114 citing opinionsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Reported abrogated on other grounds by New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”), abrogated on other ground by New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
    Supreme Court of the United StatesSep 23, 1981other groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Questioned by United States v. Watt, 309 F. Supp. 329 (1970)

    Consequently, the Chimel decision is inapplicable and we must turn to other sources against which to measure the legality of the present search.
    District Court, N.D. CaliforniaFeb 10, 1970Read it
  • Questioned by State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100 (2005)

    The Court therefore left "to future consideration the question of the continued viability of [its] analysis of the scope of the Chimel exception as expressed in Welsh.
    New Jersey Superior Court Appellate DivisionFeb 14, 2005Read it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (1979)

    While the facts of Chimel are clearly distinguishable from the present case, the rationale used by the Court is controlling.
    District Court of Appeal of FloridaDec 21, 1979Read it
  • Distinguished by State v. Tomey, 163 W. Va. 578 (1979)

    which allows the arresting officer to search the “grabbable” area in which the defendant “might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence,” 395 U.S. at 763, is inapposite since there was no danger of a weapon being grabbed from the closed suitcase.
    West Virginia Supreme CourtOct 16, 1979Read it
  • Distinguished by Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557 (1976)

    The fact that the rules announced in Chimel are inapplicable to searches of automobiles based upon probable cause {id., at p. 764, fn. 9 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 694]; People v. Freeny (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 20, 29 [112 Cal.Rptr. 33]; see fn. 5, ante) cannot be interpreted as meaning that no spatial limitations are applicable to automobiles.
    California Supreme CourtMar 19, 1976Read it
  • Distinguished by United States v. Castellana, 369 F. Supp. 376 (1973)

    Thus, the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), is inapplicable.
    District Court, M.D. FloridaMay 2, 1973Read it

The opinion

*769 Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion with these remarks concerning a factor to which the Court has not alluded.

The only thing that has given me pause in voting to overrule Harris and Rabinowitz is that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement. We simply do not know the extent to which cities and towns across the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly expanded warrant system which will be required by today’s decision; nor can we say with assurance that in each and every local situation, the warrant requirement plays an essential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus, one is now faced with the dilemma, envisioned in my separate opinion in Ker, 374 U. S., at 45-46 , of choosing between vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns, long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment before Mapp and Ker came on the books, or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights in the interest of leaving the States at least some elbow room in their methods of criminal law enforcement. No comparable dilemma exists, of course, with respect to the impact of today’s decision within the federal system itself.

This federal-state factor has not been an easy one for me to resolve, but in the last analysis I cannot in good conscience vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law.

I add only that this case, together with Benton v. Maryland, post, p. 784, North Carolina v. Pearce, ante, p. 711, and Simpson v. Rice, ante, p. 711, all decided *770 today, serve to point up, as few other cases have, the profound changes that the “incorporation doctrine” has wrought both in the workings of our federal system and upon the adjudicative processes of this Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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