Arizona v. Gant

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARIZONA v. GANT

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

No. 07–542. Argued October 7, 2008—Decided April 21, 2009

Respondent Gant was arrested for driving on a suspended license,

handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car before officers searched his car

and found cocaine in a jacket pocket. The Arizona trial court denied

his motion to suppress the evidence, and he was convicted of drug of

fenses. Reversing, the State Supreme Court distinguished New York

v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454—which held that police may search the pas

senger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a con

temporaneous incident of a recent occupant’s lawful arrest—on the

ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but

did not answer the question whether officers may conduct such a

search once the scene has been secured. Because Chimel v. Califor

nia, 395 U. S. 752, requires that a search incident to arrest be justi

fied by either the interest in officer safety or the interest in preserv

ing evidence and the circumstances of Gant’s arrest implicated

neither of those interests, the State Supreme Court found the search

unreasonable.

Held: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle inci

dent to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to believe

that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or

that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Pp. 5–18.

(a) Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable,” “subject only to

a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz

v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357. The exception for a search inci

dent to a lawful arrest applies only to “the area from within which

[an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi

dence.” Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763. This Court applied that exception

to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which rested in

large part on the assumption that articles inside a vehicle’s passen

ger compartment are “generally . . . within ‘the area into which an

2 ARIZONA v. GANT

Syllabus

arrestee might reach.’ ” 453 U. S., at 460. Pp. 5–8.

(b) This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a

vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest even if there

were no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the

time of the search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underly

ing Chimel’s exception authorize a vehicle search only when there is

a reasonable possibility of such access. Although it does not follow

from Chimel, circumstances unique to the automobile context also

justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to

believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the

vehicle.” Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632 (SCALIA, J.,

concurring in judgment). Neither Chimel’s reaching-distance rule

nor Thornton’s allowance for evidentiary searches authorized the

search in this case. In contrast to Belton, which involved a single of

ficer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, five officers hand

cuffed and secured Gant and the two other suspects in separate pa

trol cars before the search began. Gant clearly could not have

accessed his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for

the search was also lacking. Belton and Thornton were both arrested

for drug offenses, but Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended

license—an offense for which police could not reasonably expect to

find evidence in Gant’s car. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118.

The search in this case was therefore unreasonable. Pp. 8–11.

(c) This Court is unpersuaded by the State’s argument that its ex

pansive reading of Belton correctly balances law enforcement inter

ests with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle. The

State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it ex

aggerates both the clarity provided by a broad reading of Belton and

its importance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading of

Belton and Thornton, together with this Court’s other Fourth

Amendment decisions, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 103, and

United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, permit an officer to search a ve

hicle when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. Pp. 11–14.

(d) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of

Belton. The experience of the 28 years since Belton has shown that

the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is

unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumption would au

thorize myriad unconstitutional searches. Pp. 15–18.

216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,

SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concur

ring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, J., joined,

and in which BREYER, J., joined except as to Part II–E.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–542

_________________

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. RODNEY JOSEPH GANT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARIZONA

[April 21, 2009]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a

suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a

patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered

cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because

Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons

or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme

Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined

in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and applied

to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454

(1981), did not justify the search in this case. We agree

with that conclusion.

Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only

the space within an arrestee’s “ ‘immediate control,’ ”

meaning “the area from within which he might gain pos­

session of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U. S.,

at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underly­

ing Chimel’s reaching-distance rule determine Belton’s

scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize

a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after

the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the inte­

2 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

rior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thorn

ton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following

the suggestion in JUSTICE SCALIA’s opinion concurring in

the judgment in that case, id., at 632, we also conclude

that circumstances unique to the automobile context

justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to

believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be

found in the vehicle.

I

On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that

the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being

used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed

knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the

owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying

himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later.

The officers left the residence and conducted a records

check, which revealed that Gant’s driver’s license had

been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for

his arrest for driving with a suspended license.

When the officers returned to the house that evening,

they found a man near the back of the house and a woman

in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived,

they arrested the man for providing a false name and the

woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees

were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when

Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered

the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant

was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it

drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got

out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about

30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each

other, meeting 10-to-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith

immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.

Because the other arrestees were secured in the only

patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the back­

seat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and

placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his

car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a

bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.

Gant was charged with two offenses—possession of a

narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug parapherna­

lia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found).

He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on

the ground that the warrantless search violated the

Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued

that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle

because he posed no threat to the officers after he was

handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested

for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in

his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why

the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded:

“Because the law says we can do it.” App. 75.

The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the

officers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for con­

traband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it de­

nied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the

police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a

license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited

his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a

search incident to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant

guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3­

year term of imprisonment.

After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona

Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car

was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length our

decision in Belton, which held that police may search the

passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers

therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the

vehicle’s recent occupant. 216 Ariz. 1, 3–4, 162 P. 3d 640,

4 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

642–643 (2007) (citing 453 U. S., at 460). The court dis­

tinguished Belton as a case concerning the permissible

scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded

that it did not answer “the threshold question whether the

police may conduct a search incident to arrest at all once

the scene is secure.” 216 Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643.

Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, the court ob­

served that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the

warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer

safety and evidence preservation. 216 Ariz., at 4, 162

P. 3d, at 643. When “the justifications underlying Chimel

no longer exist because the scene is secure and the ar­

restee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car,

and under the supervision of an officer,” the court con­

cluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot

be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene

or prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 5, 162

P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search

of Gant’s car was unreasonable.

The dissenting justices would have upheld the search of

Gant’s car based on their view that “the validity of a Bel

ton search . . . clearly does not depend on the presence of

the Chimel rationales in a particular case.” Id., at 8, 162

P. 3d, at 647. Although they disagreed with the majority’s

view of Belton, the dissenting justices acknowledged that

“[t]he bright-line rule embraced in Belton has long been

criticized and probably merits reconsideration.” 216 Ariz.,

at 10, 162 P. 3d, at 649. They thus “add[ed their] voice[s]

to the others that have urged the Supreme Court to revisit

Belton.” Id., at 11, 163 P. 3d, at 650.

The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton in­

cludes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who

have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to

Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the

State’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2008).

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

II

Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it

should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a

warrantless search, with the basic rule that “searches

conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap­

proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”

Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote

omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant require­

ment is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Weeks v.

United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). The exception

derives from interests in officer safety and evidence pres­

ervation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 230–234

(1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.

In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may

only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his

immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the

area from within which he might gain possession of a

weapon or destructible evidence.” Ibid. That limitation,

which continues to define the boundaries of the exception,

ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is

commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting

officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of

arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid.

(noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable “in

order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to

use” and “in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruc­

tion” of evidence (emphasis added)). If there is no possibil­

ity that an arrestee could reach into the area that law

enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for

the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the

rule does not apply. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376

U. S. 364, 367–368 (1964).

In Belton, we considered Chimel’s application to the

6 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

automobile context. A lone police officer in that case

stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four

occupants. While asking for the driver’s license and regis­

tration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed

an envelope on the car floor marked “Supergold”—a name

he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable

cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug

offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed

them under arrest, and patted them down. Without hand­

cuffing the arrestees,1 the officer “ ‘split them up into four

separate areas of the Thruway . . . so they would not be in

physical touching area of each other’ ” and searched the

vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in

which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.

The New York Court of Appeals found the search uncon­

stitutional, concluding that after the occupants were

arrested the vehicle and its contents were “safely within

the exclusive custody and control of the police.” State v.

Belton, 50 N. Y. 2d 447, 452, 407 N. E. 2d 420, 423 (1980).

The State asked this Court to consider whether the excep­

tion recognized in Chimel permits an officer to search “a

jacket found inside an automobile while the automobile’s

four occupants, all under arrest, are standing unsecured

around the vehicle.” Brief in No. 80–328, p. i. We granted

certiorari because “courts ha[d] found no workable defini­

tion of ‘the area within the immediate control of the ar­

restee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an

automobile.” 453 U. S., at 460.

In its brief, the State argued that the Court of Appeals

erred in concluding that the jacket was under the officer’s

exclusive control. Focusing on the number of arrestees

and their proximity to the vehicle, the State asserted that

——————

1 The officer was unable to handcuff the occupants because he had

only one set of handcuffs. See Brief for Petitioner in New York v.

Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80–328, p. 3 (hereinafter Brief in No. 80–328).

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

it was reasonable for the officer to believe the arrestees

could have accessed the vehicle and its contents, making

the search permissible under Chimel. Brief in No. 80–328,

at 7–8. The United States, as amicus curiae in support of

the State, argued for a more permissive standard, but it

maintained that any search incident to arrest must be

“ ‘substantially contemporaneous’ ” with the arrest—a

requirement it deemed “satisfied if the search occurs

during the period in which the arrest is being consum­

mated and before the situation has so stabilized that it

could be said that the arrest was completed.” Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae in New York v. Belton,

O. T. 1980, No. 80–328, p. 14. There was no suggestion by

the parties or amici that Chimel authorizes a vehicle

search incident to arrest when there is no realistic possi­

bility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.

After considering these arguments, we held that when

an officer lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile,

he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,

search the passenger compartment of the automobile” and

any containers therein. Belton, 453 U. S., at 460 (footnote

omitted). That holding was based in large part on our

assumption “that articles inside the relatively narrow

compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile

are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the

area into which an arrestee might reach.’ ” Ibid.

The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton

as merely delineating “the proper scope of a search of the

interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest, id., at 459.

That is, when the passenger compartment is within an

arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generali­

zation that the entire compartment and any containers

therein may be reached. On that view of Belton, the state

court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unrea­

sonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his

car at the time of the search. It also found that no other

8 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.

Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton fol­

lowed by the Arizona Supreme Court.

III

Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the

Arizona Supreme Court’s reading of Belton, our opinion

has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search

incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is

no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle

at the time of the search. This reading may be attribut­

able to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he

characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction

. . . that the interior of a car is always within the immedi­

ate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the

car.” 453 U. S., at 466. Under the majority’s approach, he

argued, “the result would presumably be the same even if

[the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in

the patrol car” before conducting the search. Id., at 468.

Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given

different answers to the question whether a vehicle must

be within an arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search

incident to arrest,2 but Justice Brennan’s reading of the

——————

2 Compare United States v. Green, 324 F. 3d 375, 379 (CA5 2003)

(holding that Belton did not authorize a search of an arrestee’s vehicle

when he was handcuffed and lying facedown on the ground surrounded

by four police officers 6-to-10 feet from the vehicle), United States v.

Edwards, 242 F. 3d 928, 938 (CA10 2001) (finding unauthorized a

vehicle search conducted while the arrestee was handcuffed in the back

of a patrol car), United States v. Vasey, 834 F. 2d 782, 787 (CA9 1987)

(finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted 30-to-45 minutes after

an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in

the back of a police car), with United States v. Hrasky, 453 F. 3d 1099,

1102 (CA8 2006) (upholding a search conducted an hour after the

arrestee was apprehended and after he had been handcuffed and placed

in the back of a patrol car); United States v. Weaver, 433 F. 3d 1104,

1106 (CA9 2006) (upholding a search conducted 10-to-15 minutes after

an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

Court’s opinion has predominated. As Justice O’Connor

observed, “lower court decisions seem now to treat the

ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent

occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an excep­

tion justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.” Thornton,

541 U. S., at 624 (opinion concurring in part). JUSTICE

SCALIA has similarly noted that, although it is improbable

that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his

vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the

backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in “this

precise factual scenario . . . are legion.” Id., at 628 (opin­

ion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases).3 Indeed,

some courts have upheld searches under Belton “even

when . . . the handcuffed arrestee has already left the

scene.” 541 U. S., at 628 (same).

Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search

would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent

occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s

passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s

reach at the time of the search. To read Belton as author­

izing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s

arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications

underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly incom­

patible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way

alters the fundamental principles established in the

Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident

——————

the back of a patrol car), and United States v. White, 871 F. 2d 41, 44

(CA6 1989) (upholding a search conducted after the arrestee had been

handcuffed and secured in the back of a police cruiser).

3 The practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the ar­

restee has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car has not abated

since we decided Thornton. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 221 Fed.

Appx. 715, 717 (CA10 2007); Hrasky, 453 F. 3d, at 1100; Weaver, 433

F. 3d, at 1105; United States v. Williams, 170 Fed. Appx. 399, 401 (CA6

2006); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 1038, 1041 (CA9 2005); United

States v. Osife, 398 F. 3d 1143, 1144 (CA9 2005); United States v.

Sumrall, 115 Fed. Appx. 22, 24 (CA10 2004).

10 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

to lawful custodial arrests.” 453 U. S., at 460, n. 3. Ac­

cordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that

the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle

incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the ar­

restee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the

passenger compartment at the time of the search.4

Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also con­

clude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context

justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “rea­

sonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest

might be found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632

(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). In many cases, as

when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation,

there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle

contains relevant evidence. See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago

Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 324 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525

U. S. 113, 118 (1998). But in others, including Belton and

Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for

searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s

vehicle and any containers therein.

Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of

discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search

in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single

officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five

officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of

whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol

cars before the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those

——————

4 Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of

vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable

to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the

arrestee’s vehicle remains. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure

§7.1(c), p. 525 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter LaFave) (noting that the

availability of protective measures “ensur[es] the nonexistence of

circumstances in which the arrestee’s ‘control’ of the car is in doubt”).

But in such a case a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching

distance of his car at the time of the search. An eviden­

tiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case.

Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug

offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended

license—an offense for which police could not expect to

find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car.

Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Because police could not

reasonably have believed either that Gant could have

accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence

of the offense for which he was arrested might have been

found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.

IV

The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona

Supreme Court’s conclusion that Gant could not have

accessed his vehicle at the time of the search, but it never­

theless asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under

the broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State

argues that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of

the possibility of access in a given case because that ex­

pansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests,

including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an ar­

restee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle.

For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument.

First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy inter­

ests at stake. Although we have recognized that a motor­

ist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than

in his home, see New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 112–

113 (1986), the former interest is nevertheless important

and deserving of constitutional protection, see Knowles,

525 U. S., at 117. It is particularly significant that Belton

searches authorize police officers to search not just the

passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or

other container within that space. A rule that gives police

the power to conduct such a search whenever an individ­

12 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

ual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no

basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found

in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the

privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of

that threat implicates the central concern underlying the

Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police

officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a

person’s private effects.5

At the same time as it undervalues these privacy con­

cerns, the State exaggerates the clarity that its reading of

Belton provides. Courts that have read Belton expansively

are at odds regarding how close in time to the arrest and

how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first

contact with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter

within Belton’s purview6 and whether a search is reason­

——————

5 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Chimel, 395

U. S., at 760–761; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 480–484 (1965);

Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 389–392 (1914); Boyd v. United

States, 116 U. S. 616, 624–625 (1886); see also 10 C. Adams, The Works

of John Adams 247–248 (1856). Many have observed that a broad

reading of Belton gives police limitless discretion to conduct exploratory

searches. See 3 LaFave §7.1(c), at 527 (observing that Belton creates

the risk “that police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise

would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment

otherwise prohibits”); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d

889, 894 (CA9 1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (observing that Belton has

been applied to condone “purely exploratory searches of vehicles during

which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are

allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might find”);

State v. Pallone, 2001 WI 77, ¶¶87–90, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 203–204, and

n. 9, 613 N. W. 2d 568, 588, and n. 9 (2000) (Abrahamson, C. J., dis­

senting) (same); State v. Pierce, 136 N. J. 184, 211, 642 A. 2d 947, 961

(1994) (same).

6 Compare United States v. Caseres, 533 F. 3d 1064, 1072 (CA9 2008)

(declining to apply Belton when the arrestee was approached by police

after he had exited his vehicle and reached his residence), with Rainey

v. Commonwealth, 197 S. W. 3d 89, 94–95 (Ky. 2006) (applying Belton

when the arrestee was apprehended 50 feet from the vehicle), and

Black v. State, 810 N. E. 2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

able when it commences or continues after the arrestee

has been removed from the scene.7 The rule has thus

generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a

rule touted as providing a “bright line.” See 3 LaFave,

§7.1(c), at 514–524.

Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of

Belton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement

safety and evidentiary interests. Under our view, Belton

and Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search

when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle

or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence

of the offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to

the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under

additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary con­

cerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S.

1032 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s pas­

senger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion

that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is “dan­

gerous” and might access the vehicle to “gain immediate

control of weapons.” Id., at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392

U. S. 1, 21 (1968)). If there is probable cause to believe a

vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United

States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 820–821 (1982), authorizes a

search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence

might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by

——————

the arrestee was apprehended inside an auto repair shop and the

vehicle was parked outside).

7 Compare McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d, at 890–891 (upholding a search

that commenced five minutes after the arrestee was removed from the

scene), United States v. Snook, 88 F. 3d 605, 608 (CA8 1996) (same),

and United States v. Doward, 41 F. 3d 789, 793 (CA1 1994) (upholding

a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene),

with United States v. Lugo, 978 F. 2d 631, 634 (CA10 1992) (holding

invalid a search that commenced after the arrestee was removed from

the scene), and State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 427–428, 512 A. 2d

160, 169 (1986) (holding invalid a search that continued after the

arrestee was removed from the scene).

14 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE SCALIA’s opinion concurring in the judgment in

Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches

for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of

arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader.

Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which

safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf.

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that,

incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protec­

tive sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasona­

bly suspects a dangerous person may be hiding).

These exceptions together ensure that officers may

search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary con­

cerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent

occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to

allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve

no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is

anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a war­

rantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are

unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad read­

ing of Belton would meaningfully further law enforcement

interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individu­

als’ privacy.8

——————

8 At least eight States have reached the same conclusion. Vermont,

New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon,

and Wyoming have declined to follow a broad reading of Belton under

their state constitutions. See State v. Bauder, 181 Vt. 392, 401, 924

A. 2d 38, 46–47 (2007); State v. Eckel, 185 N. J. 523, 540, 888 A. 2d

1266, 1277 (2006); Camacho v. State, 119 Nev. 395, 399–400, 75 P. 3d

370, 373–374 (2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476, 488–489 (Wyo.

1999); State v. Arredondo, 1997–NMCA–081, 123 N. M. 628, 636 (Ct.

App.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999–NMCA–

107, 127 N. M. 752 (Ct. App.); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 57,

669 A. 2d 896, 902 (1995); People v. Blasich, 73 N. Y. 2d 673, 678, 541

N. E. 2d 40, 43 (1989); State v. Fesler, 68 Ore. App. 609, 612, 685 P. 2d

1014, 1016–1017 (1984). And a Massachusetts statute provides that a

search incident to arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 15

Opinion of the Court

V

Our dissenting colleagues argue that the doctrine of

stare decisis requires adherence to a broad reading of

Belton even though the justifications for searching a vehi­

cle incident to arrest are in most cases absent.9 The doc­

trine of stare decisis is of course “essential to the respect

accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability

of the law,” but it does not compel us to follow a past

decision when its rationale no longer withstands “careful

analysis.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003).

We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the con­

tinuance of an unconstitutional police practice. And we

would be particularly loath to uphold an unconstitutional

result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the

decisions that arguably compel it. The safety and eviden­

tiary interests that supported the search in Belton simply

are not present in this case. Indeed, it is hard to imagine

two cases that are factually more distinct, as Belton in­

volved one officer confronted by four unsecured arrestees

suspected of committing a drug offense and this case

involves several officers confronted with a securely de­

tained arrestee apprehended for driving with a suspended

license. This case is also distinguishable from Thornton,

in which the petitioner was arrested for a drug offense. It

is thus unsurprising that Members of this Court who

——————

weapons or evidence of the offense of arrest. See Commonwealth v.

Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 161–162, 448 N. E. 2d 1264, 1266–1267 (1983)

(citing Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 276, §1 (West 2007)).

9 JUSTICE ALITO’s dissenting opinion also accuses us of “overrul[ing]”

Belton and Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), “even

though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.” Post, at 1. Con­

trary to that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is

precisely the result Gant has urged. That JUSTICE ALITO has chosen

to describe this decision as overruling our earlier cases does not

change the fact that the resulting rule of law is the one advocated by

respondent.

16 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

concurred in the judgments in Belton and Thornton also

concur in the decision in this case.10

We do not agree with the contention in JUSTICE ALITO’s

dissent (hereinafter dissent) that consideration of police

reliance interests requires a different result. Although it

appears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely

taught in police academies and that law enforcement

officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle

searches during the past 28 years,11 many of these

searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the

Chimel exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing

more serious than a traffic violation have had their consti­

tutional right to the security of their private effects vio­

lated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement com­

munity may view the State’s version of the Belton rule as

an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance

interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest

that all individuals share in having their constitutional

rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is

unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly

outweighs any law enforcement “entitlement” to its persis­

tence. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978)

(“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more

efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth

Amendment”). The dissent’s reference in this regard to

the reliance interests cited in Dickerson v. United States,

530 U. S. 428 (2000), is misplaced. See post, at 5. In

observing that “Miranda has become embedded in routine

——————

10 JUSTICESTEVENS concurred in the judgment in Belton, 453 U. S., at

463, for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v.

California, 453 U. S. 420, 444 (1981), JUSTICE THOMAS joined the

Court’s opinion in Thornton, 541 U. S. 615, and JUSTICE SCALIA and

JUSTICE GINSBURG concurred in the judgment in that case, id., at 625.

11 Because a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the

doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for

searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 17

Opinion of the Court

police practice to the point where the warnings have be­

come part of our national culture,” 530 U. S., at 443, the

Court was referring not to police reliance on a rule requir­

ing them to provide warnings but to the broader societal

reliance on that individual right.

The dissent also ignores the checkered history of the

search-incident-to-arrest exception. Police authority to

search the place in which a lawful arrest is made was

broadly asserted in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192

(1927), and limited a few years later in Go-Bart Importing

Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), and United

States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). The limiting

views expressed in Go-Bart and Lefokwitz were in turn

abandoned in Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145

(1947), which upheld a search of a four-room apartment

incident to the occupant’s arrest. Only a year later the

Court in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 708

(1948), retreated from that holding, noting that the

search-incident-to-arrest exception is “a strictly limited”

one that must be justified by “something more in the way

of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.” And just two

years after that, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.

56 (1950), the Court again reversed course and upheld the

search of an entire apartment. Finally, our opinion in

Chimel overruled Rabinowitz and what remained of Har

ris and established the present boundaries of the search­

incident-to-arrest exception. Notably, none of the dissent­

ers in Chimel or the cases that preceded it argued that law

enforcement reliance interests outweighed the interest in

protecting individual constitutional rights so as to warrant

fidelity to an unjustifiable rule.

The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton

has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad

reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that

articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely

“within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach,’ ” 453

18 ARIZONA v. GANT

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 460, and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty as­

sumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional

searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us

to approve routine constitutional violations.

VI

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occu­

pant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching dis­

tance of the passenger compartment at the time of the

search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains

evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications

are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unrea­

sonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that an­

other exception to the warrant requirement applies. The

Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case in­

volved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment

of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

SCALIA, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–542

_________________

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. RODNEY JOSEPH GANT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARIZONA

[April 21, 2009]

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.

To determine what is an “unreasonable” search within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to

the historical practices the Framers sought to preserve; if

those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional

standards of reasonableness. See Virginia v. Moore, 553

U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 3–6). Since the historical

scope of officers’ authority to search vehicles incident to

arrest is uncertain, see Thornton v. United States, 541

U. S. 615, 629–631 (2004) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg

ment), traditional standards of reasonableness govern. It

is abundantly clear that those standards do not justify

what I take to be the rule set forth in New York v. Belton,

453 U. S. 454 (1981), and Thornton: that arresting officers

may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect

themselves from hidden weapons. When an arrest is

made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually

always have a less intrusive and more effective means of

ensuring their safety—and a means that is virtually al

ways employed: ordering the arrestee away from the

vehicle, patting him down in the open, handcuffing him,

and placing him in the squad car.

Law enforcement officers face a risk of being shot when

ever they pull a car over. But that risk is at its height at

the time of the initial confrontation; and it is not at all

reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after

2 ARIZONA v. GANT

SCALIA, J., concurring

the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car.

I observed in Thornton that the government had failed to

provide a single instance in which a formerly restrained

arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehi

cle, 541 U. S., at 626; Arizona and its amici have not

remedied that significant deficiency in the present case.

It must be borne in mind that we are speaking here only

of a rule automatically permitting a search when the

driver or an occupant is arrested. Where no arrest is

made, we have held that officers may search the car if

they reasonably believe “the suspect is dangerous and . . .

may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v.

Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983). In the no-arrest case,

the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always

exists, since the driver or passenger will be allowed to

return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed.

The rule of Michigan v. Long is not at issue here.

JUSTICE STEVENS acknowledges that an officer-safety

rationale cannot justify all vehicle searches incident to

arrest, but asserts that that is not the rule Belton and

Thornton adopted. (As described above, I read those cases

differently). JUSTICE STEVENS would therefore retain the

application of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969),

in the car-search context but would apply in the future

what he believes our cases held in the past: that officers

making a roadside stop may search the vehicle so long as

the “arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger

compartment at the time of the search.” Ante, at 18. I

believe that this standard fails to provide the needed

guidance to arresting officers and also leaves much room

for manipulation, inviting officers to leave the scene unse

cured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved)

in order to conduct a vehicle search. In my view we should

simply abandon the Belton-Thornton charade of officer

safety and overrule those cases. I would hold that a vehi

cle search incident to arrest is ipso facto “reasonable” only

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

SCALIA, J., concurring

when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for

which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the

officer has probable cause to believe occurred. Because

respondent was arrested for driving without a license (a

crime for which no evidence could be expected to be found

in the vehicle), I would hold in the present case that the

search was unlawful.

JUSTICE ALITO insists that the Court must demand a

good reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true

enough, but it seems to me ample reason that the prece

dent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this

case unconstitutional) results. See Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). We should recognize Belton’s

fanciful reliance upon officer safety for what it was: “a

return to the broader sort of [evidence-gathering] search

incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel.” Thorn

ton, supra, at 631 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment;

citations omitted).

JUSTICE ALITO argues that there is no reason to adopt a

rule limiting automobile-arrest searches to those cases

where the search’s object is evidence of the crime of arrest.

Post, at 10 (dissenting opinion). I disagree. This formula

tion of officers’ authority both preserves the outcomes of

our prior cases and tethers the scope and rationale of the

doctrine to the triggering event. Belton, by contrast,

allowed searches precisely when its exigency-based ra

tionale was least applicable: The fact of the arrest in the

automobile context makes searches on exigency grounds

less reasonable, not more. I also disagree with JUSTICE

ALITO’s conclusory assertion that this standard will be

difficult to administer in practice, post, at 7; the ease of its

application in this case would suggest otherwise.

No other Justice, however, shares my view that applica

tion of Chimel in this context should be entirely aban

doned. It seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come

forth with a 4-to-1-to-4 opinion that leaves the governing

4 ARIZONA v. GANT

SCALIA, J., concurring

rule uncertain. I am therefore confronted with the choice

of either leaving the current understanding of Belton and

Thornton in effect, or acceding to what seems to me the

artificial narrowing of those cases adopted by JUSTICE

STEVENS. The latter, as I have said, does not provide the

degree of certainty I think desirable in this field; but the

former opens the field to what I think are plainly uncon

stitutional searches—which is the greater evil. I therefore

join the opinion of the Court.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–542

_________________

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. RODNEY JOSEPH GANT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARIZONA

[April 21, 2009]

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.

I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that New York v. Belton,

453 U. S. 454 (1981), is best read as setting forth a bright

line rule that permits a warrantless search of the passen

ger compartment of an automobile incident to the lawful

arrest of an occupant—regardless of the danger the ar

rested individual in fact poses. I also agree with JUSTICE

STEVENS, however, that the rule can produce results

divorced from its underlying Fourth Amendment ration

ale. Compare Belton, supra, with Chimel v. California,

395 U. S. 752, 764 (1969) (explaining that the rule allow

ing contemporaneous searches is justified by the need to

prevent harm to a police officer or destruction of evidence

of the crime). For that reason I would look for a better

rule—were the question before us one of first impression.

The matter, however, is not one of first impression, and

that fact makes a substantial difference. The Belton rule

has been followed not only by this Court in Thornton v.

United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), but also by numerous

other courts. Principles of stare decisis must apply, and

those who wish this Court to change a well-established

legal precedent—where, as here, there has been consider

able reliance on the legal rule in question—bear a heavy

burden. Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.

PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 17–19)

(BREYER, J., dissenting). I have not found that burden

2 ARIZONA v. GANT

BREYER, J., dissenting

met. Nor do I believe that the other considerations ordi

narily relevant when determining whether to overrule a

case are satisfied. I consequently join JUSTICE ALITO’s

dissenting opinion with the exception of Part II-E.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–542

_________________

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. RODNEY JOSEPH GANT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARIZONA

[April 21, 2009]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and

JUSTICE KENNEDY join, and with whom JUSTICE BREYER

joins except as to Part II–E, dissenting.

Twenty-eight years ago, in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S.

454, 460 (1981), this Court held that “when a policeman

has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that

arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automo

bile.” (Footnote omitted.) Five years ago, in Thornton v.

United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004)—a case involving a

situation not materially distinguishable from the situation

here—the Court not only reaffirmed but extended the

holding of Belton, making it applicable to recent occu

pants. Today’s decision effectively overrules those impor

tant decisions, even though respondent Gant has not

asked us to do so.

To take the place of the overruled precedents, the Court

adopts a new two-part rule under which a police officer

who arrests a vehicle occupant or recent occupant may

search the passenger compartment if (1) the arrestee is

within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the

search or (2) the officer has reason to believe that the

vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Ante, at

18. The first part of this new rule may endanger arresting

officers and is truly endorsed by only four Justices;

JUSTICE SCALIA joins solely for the purpose of avoiding a

2 ARIZONA v. GANT

ALITO, J., dissenting

“4-to-1-to 4 opinion.” Ante, at 4 (concurring opinion). The

second part of the new rule is taken from JUSTICE SCALIA’s

separate opinion in Thornton without any independent

explanation of its origin or justification and is virtually

certain to confuse law enforcement officers and judges for

some time to come. The Court’s decision will cause the

suppression of evidence gathered in many searches carried

out in good-faith reliance on well-settled case law, and

although the Court purports to base its analysis on the

landmark decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752

(1969), the Court’s reasoning undermines Chimel. I would

follow Belton, and I therefore respectfully dissent.

I

Although the Court refuses to acknowledge that it is

overruling Belton and Thornton, there can be no doubt

that it does so.

In Belton, an officer on the New York Thruway removed

the occupants from a car and placed them under arrest but

did not handcuff them. See 453 U. S., at 456; Brief for

Petitioner in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80–328,

p. 3. The officer then searched a jacket on the car’s back

seat and found drugs. 453 U. S., at 455. By a divided

vote, the New York Court of Appeals held that the search

of the jacket violated Chimel, in which this Court held

that an arresting officer may search the area within an

arrestee’s immediate control. See State v. Belton, 50 N. Y.

2d 447, 407 N. E. 2d 420 (1980). The justices of the New

York Court of Appeals disagreed on the factual question

whether the Belton arrestees could have gained access to

the car. The majority thought that they could not have

done so, id., at 452, n. 2, 407 N. E. 2d, at 423, n. 2, but the

dissent thought that this was a real possibility. Id., at

453, 407 N. E. 2d, at 424 (opinion of Gabrielli, J.).

Viewing this disagreement about the application of the

Chimel rule as illustrative of a persistent and important

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

problem, the Belton Court concluded that “ ‘[a] single

familiar standard’ ” was “ ‘essential to guide police offi

cers’ ” who make roadside arrests. 453 U. S., at 458 (quot

ing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213–214 (1979)).

The Court acknowledged that articles in the passenger

compartment of a car are not always within an arrestee’s

reach, but “[i]n order to establish the workable rule this

category of cases requires,” the Court adopted a rule that

categorically permits the search of a car’s passenger com

partment incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant. 453

U. S., at 460.

The precise holding in Belton could not be clearer. The

Court stated unequivocally: “[W]e hold that when a po

liceman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant

of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident

of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that

automobile.” Ibid. (footnote omitted).

Despite this explicit statement, the opinion of the Court

in the present case curiously suggests that Belton may

reasonably be read as adopting a holding that is narrower

than the one explicitly set out in the Belton opinion,

namely, that an officer arresting a vehicle occupant may

search the passenger compartment “when the passenger

compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance.”

Ante, at 7–8 (emphasis in original). According to the

Court, the broader reading of Belton that has gained wide

acceptance “may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s

dissent.” Ante, at 8.

Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, however, Justice

Brennan’s Belton dissent did not mischaracterize the

Court’s holding in that case or cause that holding to be

misinterpreted. As noted, the Belton Court explicitly

stated precisely what it held. In Thornton, the Court

recognized the scope of Belton’s holding. See 541 U. S., at

620. So did JUSTICE SCALIA’s separate opinion. See id., at

625 (opinion concurring in judgment) (“In [Belton] we set

4 ARIZONA v. GANT

ALITO, J., dissenting

forth a bright-line rule for arrests of automobile occupants,

holding that . . . a search of the whole [passenger] com

partment is justified in every case”). So does JUSTICE

SCALIA’s opinion in the present case. See ante, at 1 (Bel

ton and Thornton held that “arresting officers may always

search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect themselves

from hidden weapons”). This “bright-line rule” has now

been interred.

II

Because the Court has substantially overruled Belton

and Thornton, the Court must explain why its departure

from the usual rule of stare decisis is justified. I recognize

that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” Payne

v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991), and applies less

rigidly in constitutional cases, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370

U. S. 530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion). But the Court

has said that a constitutional precedent should be followed

unless there is a “ ‘special justification’ ” for its abandon

ment. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443

(2000). Relevant factors identified in prior cases include

whether the precedent has engendered reliance, id., at

442, whether there has been an important change in

circumstances in the outside world, Randall v. Sorrell, 548

U. S. 230, 244 (2006) (plurality opinion); Burnet v. Coro

nado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting), whether the precedent has proved to be

unworkable, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 306 (2004)

(plurality opinion) (citing Payne, supra, at 827), whether

the precedent has been undermined by later decisions, see,

e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164,

173–174 (1989), and whether the decision was badly rea

soned. Vieth, supra, at 306 (plurality opinion). These

factors weigh in favor of retaining the rule established in

Belton.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

A

Reliance. While reliance is most important in “cases

involving property and contract rights,” Payne, supra, at

828, the Court has recognized that reliance by law en

forcement officers is also entitled to weight. In Dickerson,

the Court held that principles of stare decisis “weigh[ed]”

heavily against overruling Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.

436 (1966), because the Miranda rule had become “em

bedded in routine police practice.” 530 U. S., at 443.

If there was reliance in Dickerson, there certainly is

substantial reliance here. The Belton rule has been

taught to police officers for more than a quarter century.

Many searches—almost certainly including more than a

few that figure in cases now on appeal—were conducted in

scrupulous reliance on that precedent. It is likely that, on

the very day when this opinion is announced, numerous

vehicle searches will be conducted in good faith by police

officers who were taught the Belton rule.

The opinion of the Court recognizes that “Belton has

been widely taught in police academies and that law en

forcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting

vehicle searches during the past 28 years.” Ante, at 16.

But for the Court, this seemingly counts for nothing. The

Court states that “[w]e have never relied on stare decisis

to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police

practice,” ante, at 15, but of course the Court routinely

relies on decisions sustaining the constitutionality of

police practices without doing what the Court has done

here—sua sponte considering whether those decisions

should be overruled. And the Court cites no authority for

the proposition that stare decisis may be disregarded or

provides only lesser protection when the precedent that is

challenged is one that sustained the constitutionality of a

law enforcement practice.

The Court also errs in arguing that the reliance interest

that was given heavy weight in Dickerson was not “police

6 ARIZONA v. GANT

ALITO, J., dissenting

reliance on a rule requiring them to provide warnings but

to the broader societal reliance on that individual right.”

Ante, at 17. The Dickerson opinion makes no reference to

“societal reliance,” and petitioner in that case contended

that there had been reliance on Miranda because, among

other things, “[f]or nearly thirty-five years, Miranda’s

requirements ha[d] shaped law enforcement training [and]

police conduct.” See Brief for Petitioner in Dickerson v.

United States, O. T. 1999, No. 99–5525, p. 33.

B

Changed circumstances. Abandonment of the Belton

rule cannot be justified on the ground that the dangers

surrounding the arrest of a vehicle occupant are different

today than they were 28 years ago. The Court claims that

“[w]e now know that articles inside the passenger com

partment are rarely ‘within “the area into which an ar

restee might reach,” ’ ” ante, at 17–18, but surely it was

well known in 1981 that a person who is taken from a

vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car

is unlikely to make it back into his own car to retrieve a

weapon or destroy evidence.

C

Workability. The Belton rule has not proved to be un

workable. On the contrary, the rule was adopted for the

express purpose of providing a test that would be rela

tively easy for police officers and judges to apply. The

Court correctly notes that even the Belton rule is not

perfectly clear in all situations. Specifically, it is some

times debatable whether a search is or is not contempora

neous with an arrest, ante, at 6–7, but that problem is

small in comparison with the problems that the Court’s

new two-part rule will produce.

The first part of the Court’s new rule—which permits

the search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment if it is

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

within an arrestee’s reach at the time of the search—

reintroduces the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific

decisionmaking that the Belton rule was adopted to avoid.

As the situation in Belton illustrated, there are cases in

which it is unclear whether an arrestee could retrieve a

weapon or evidence in the passenger compartment of a

car.

Even more serious problems will also result from the

second part of the Court’s new rule, which requires officers

making roadside arrests to determine whether there is

reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the

crime of arrest. What this rule permits in a variety of

situations is entirely unclear.

D

Consistency with later cases. The Belton bright-line rule

has not been undermined by subsequent cases. On the

contrary, that rule was reaffirmed and extended just five

years ago in Thornton.

E

Bad reasoning. The Court is harshly critical of Belton’s

reasoning, but the problem that the Court perceives can

not be remedied simply by overruling Belton. Belton

represented only a modest—and quite defensible—

extension of Chimel, as I understand that decision.

Prior to Chimel, the Court’s precedents permitted an

arresting officer to search the area within an arrestee’s

“possession” and “control” for the purpose of gathering

evidence. See 395 U. S., at 759–760. Based on this “ab

stract doctrine,” id., at 760, n. 4, the Court had sustained

searches that extended far beyond an arrestee’s grabbing

area. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950)

(search of entire office); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S.

145 (1947) (search of entire apartment).

The Chimel Court, in an opinion written by Justice

8 ARIZONA v. GANT

ALITO, J., dissenting

Stewart, overruled these cases. Concluding that there are

only two justifications for a warrantless search incident to

arrest—officer safety and the preservation of evidence—

the Court stated that such a search must be confined to

“the arrestee’s person” and “the area from within which he

might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi

dence.” 395 U. S., at 762–763.

Unfortunately, Chimel did not say whether “the area

from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a

weapon or destructible evidence” is to be measured at the

time of the arrest or at the time of the search, but unless

the Chimel rule was meant to be a specialty rule, applica

ble to only a few unusual cases, the Court must have

intended for this area to be measured at the time of arrest.

This is so because the Court can hardly have failed to

appreciate the following two facts. First, in the great

majority of cases, an officer making an arrest is able to

handcuff the arrestee and remove him to a secure place

before conducting a search incident to the arrest. See

ante, at 10, n. 4 (stating that it is “the rare case” in which

an arresting officer cannot secure an arrestee before con

ducting a search). Second, because it is safer for an ar

resting officer to secure an arrestee before searching, it is

likely that this is what arresting officers do in the great

majority of cases. (And it appears, not surprisingly, that

this is in fact the prevailing practice.1) Thus, if the area

within an arrestee’s reach were assessed, not at the time

of arrest, but at the time of the search, the Chimel rule

would rarely come into play.

Moreover, if the applicability of the Chimel rule turned

on whether an arresting officer chooses to secure an ar

restee prior to conducting a search, rather than searching

first and securing the arrestee later, the rule would “cre

——————

1 See Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reex

amination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 665.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

ALITO, J., dissenting

ate a perverse incentive for an arresting officer to prolong

the period during which the arrestee is kept in an area

where he could pose a danger to the officer.” United States

v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F. 3d 664, 669 (CADC 1996). If this is

the law, the D. C. Circuit observed, “the law would truly

be, as Mr. Bumble said, ‘a ass.’ ” Ibid. See also United

States v. Tejada, 524 F. 3d 809, 812 (CA7 2008) (“[I]f the

police could lawfully have searched the defendant’s grab

bing radius at the moment of arrest, he has no legitimate

complaint if, the better to protect themselves from him,

they first put him outside that radius”).

I do not think that this is what the Chimel Court in

tended. Handcuffs were in use in 1969. The ability of

arresting officers to secure arrestees before conducting a

search—and their incentive to do so—are facts that can

hardly have escaped the Court’s attention. I therefore

believe that the Chimel Court intended that its new rule

apply in cases in which the arrestee is handcuffed before

the search is conducted.

The Belton Court, in my view, proceeded on the basis of

this interpretation of Chimel. Again speaking through

Justice Stewart, the Belton Court reasoned that articles in

the passenger compartment of a car are “generally, even if

not inevitably” within an arrestee’s reach. 453 U. S., at

460. This is undoubtedly true at the time of the arrest of a

person who is seated in a car but plainly not true when the

person has been removed from the car and placed in hand

cuffs. Accordingly, the Belton Court must have proceeded

on the assumption that the Chimel rule was to be applied

at the time of arrest. And that is why the Belton Court

was able to say that its decision “in no way alter[ed] the

fundamental principles established in the Chimel case

regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful

custodial arrests.” 453 U. S., at 460, n. 3. Viewing Chimel

as having focused on the time of arrest, Belton’s only new

step was to eliminate the need to decide on a case-by-case

10 ARIZONA v. GANT

ALITO, J., dissenting

basis whether a particular person seated in a car actually

could have reached the part of the passenger compartment

where a weapon or evidence was hidden. For this reason,

if we are going to reexamine Belton, we should also reex

amine the reasoning in Chimel on which Belton rests.

F

The Court, however, does not reexamine Chimel and

thus leaves the law relating to searches incident to arrest

in a confused and unstable state. The first part of the

Court’s new two-part rule—which permits an arresting

officer to search the area within an arrestee’s reach at

the time of the search—applies, at least for now, only to

vehicle occupants and recent occupants, but there is no

logical reason why the same rule should not apply to all

arrestees.

The second part of the Court’s new rule, which the

Court takes uncritically from JUSTICE SCALIA’s separate

opinion in Thornton, raises doctrinal and practical prob

lems that the Court makes no effort to address. Why, for

example, is the standard for this type of evidence

gathering search “reason to believe” rather than probable

cause? And why is this type of search restricted to evi

dence of the offense of arrest? It is true that an arrestee’s

vehicle is probably more likely to contain evidence of the

crime of arrest than of some other crime, but if reason-to

believe is the governing standard for an evidence

gathering search incident to arrest, it is not easy to see

why an officer should not be able to search when the offi

cer has reason to believe that the vehicle in question

possesses evidence of a crime other than the crime of

arrest.

Nor is it easy to see why an evidence-gathering search

incident to arrest should be restricted to the passenger

compartment. The Belton rule was limited in this way

because the passenger compartment was considered to be

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

ALITO, J., dissenting

the area that vehicle occupants can generally reach, 453

U. S., at 460, but since the second part of the new rule is

not based on officer safety or the preservation of evidence,

the ground for this limitation is obscure.2

III

Respondent in this case has not asked us to overrule

Belton, much less Chimel. Respondent’s argument rests

entirely on an interpretation of Belton that is plainly

incorrect, an interpretation that disregards Belton’s ex

plicit delineation of its holding. I would therefore leave

any reexamination of our prior precedents for another day,

if such a reexamination is to be undertaken at all. In this

case, I would simply apply Belton and reverse the judg

ment below.

——————

2I do not understand the Court’s decision to reach the following

situations. First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but

not all of the occupants of a vehicle. The Court’s decision in this case

does not address the question whether in such a situation a search of

the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that the

occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve

a weapon or destroy evidence. Second, there may be situations in

which an arresting officer has cause to fear that persons who were not

passengers in the car might attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence

from the car while the officer is still on the scene. The decision in this

case, as I understand it, does not address that situation either.