laying out three elements of § 922(j): “that (1) the defendant possessed a stolen firearm, (2) the firearm was part of interstate commerce, and (3) [he] knew or had reason to know that the firearm [was] stolen” (footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- laying out three elements of § 922(j): “that (1) the defendant possessed a stolen firearm, (2) the firearm was part of interstate commerce, and (3) [he] knew or had reason to know that the firearm [was] stolen” (footnote omitted)
- holding that a defendant’s 1995 armed robbery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA
- following Lockley and concluding that a Florida armed robbery conviction qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA
- stating that “knowledge . . . arising after the initiation of the offense may be sufficient to support an aiding and abetting conviction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
concurring as to Parts I, II, and III.D, and in the . judgment:
I concur in Parts I, II, and III.D of the Court’s opinion. But the remainder of Part III of the opinion gives me pause. All members of the panel agree that United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011), answers in the affirmative the question of whether Defendant qualifies as an armed career criminal for federal sentencing purposes. That prior precedent is controlling on this panel with or without United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, unlike my Eleventh Circuit colleagues, I would resolve the sentencing issue in this ease on the basis of Lockley alone and leave for another day the question of the continuing viability of Dowd.