finding, pre-Bruen, that “the historical evidence cited by Heller and the government does not directly support the proposition that persons who were once committed due to mental illness are forever ineligible to regain their second amendment rights”
How later courts described this case
- finding, pre-Bruen, that “the historical evidence cited by Heller and the government does not directly support the proposition that persons who were once committed due to mental illness are forever ineligible to regain their second amendment rights”
- holding that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing challenged law not burdening the core of the Second Amendment right but placing a substantial burden on conduct and persons protected by the Second Amendment
- stating that the federal regulations make it clear that Section 922(g)(4)"applies only to persons who are involuntarily committed by an appropriate judicial authority following due process safeguards"
- remanding to the district court .because it could not "conclude, based on the current record, that the government ha[d] carried its burden to establish a reasonable fit between the important goals of reducing crime and suicides and § 922(g)(4)’s’per-manent disarmament of all persons with a prior commitment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
ROGERS, J.,
dissenting.
I join Parts I, II, III.A-C, and Part III.D.i of the lead opinion. However, for the reasons given in Part II.B of Judge Moore’s dissent, § 922(g)(4) meets the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. The judgment of the district court dismissing Tyler’s suit in its entirety should accordingly be affirmed.