finding, pre-Bruen, that “the historical evidence cited by Heller and the government does not directly support the proposition that persons who were once committed due to mental illness are forever ineligible to regain their second amendment rights”
How later courts described this case
- finding, pre-Bruen, that “the historical evidence cited by Heller and the government does not directly support the proposition that persons who were once committed due to mental illness are forever ineligible to regain their second amendment rights”
- holding that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing challenged law not burdening the core of the Second Amendment right but placing a substantial burden on conduct and persons protected by the Second Amendment
- stating that the federal regulations make it clear that Section 922(g)(4)"applies only to persons who are involuntarily committed by an appropriate judicial authority following due process safeguards"
- remanding to the district court .because it could not "conclude, based on the current record, that the government ha[d] carried its burden to establish a reasonable fit between the important goals of reducing crime and suicides and § 922(g)(4)’s’per-manent disarmament of all persons with a prior commitment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING IN MOST OF THE JUDGMENT
BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in most of the judgment.
Each of today’s opinions holding that the district court should be reversed makes excellent points with respect to this hotly controverted issue and the complicated structure that Congress has established, and I have joined each of them. I write separately to add to the number of opinions only to state the following.
Because the majority of the court has determined not to revisit our precedent in Greeno, which requires that we choose and apply a level of scrutiny, I believe that the analysis I laid out in the panel’s now-vacated opinion is correct so long as we are bound by Greeno. The proper level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny, as with other fundamental constitutional rights, and under that standard of review, the district court’s opinion cannot stand for the reasons stated in that opinion.
In light of the view of the majority of the court, however, I acknowledge that the directions given in the lead opinion to the district court are appropriate under the opinion’s intermediate-scrutiny standard of review.