Opinion

DONNA MARSDEN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

  • 142 A.3d 525
  • 2016 D.C. App. LEXIS 252
  • 2016 WL 3769302
Court
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Filed
Jul 14, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Farrell
On the bench
Thompson, McLeese, Farrell
Cited by
11 cases

explaining that to prove unjust enrichment under D.C. law, a plaintiff must United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 21-7026 September Term, 2021 show that the defendant retained “a benefit” conferred by the plaintiff

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that to prove unjust enrichment under D.C. law, a plaintiff must United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 21-7026 September Term, 2021 show that the defendant retained “a benefit” conferred by the plaintiff
  • "[R]equiring repayment may be inequitable where [an] innocent recipient relied on [a] benefit to make expenditures that [the] recipient would not otherwise have made."
  • reciting the elements of unjust enrichment, including that the plaintiff must confer a benefit on the defendant

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FARRELL, Senior Judge,

concurring:

The District should consider pursuing amending legislation or a regulatory initiative in this area. Overpayments of disability compensation cannot be a rarity, witness the elaborate statutory administrative process the court summarizes for deciding which should be recouped and which forgiven. If the decision is to recoup, one would logically expect that same process to lead to an administrative order of repayment, followed by an appeal of right to the Office of Administrative Hearings by the aggrieved payee.

But the statute does not so provide, which means that if the District believes funds are being unjustly retained, it must file suit in Superior Court to reclaim them; and then a Superior Court judge must conduct “a highly contextual balancing of all of the equities,” ante at 529-30, to decide whether an order of repayment is just in the circumstances — very much like the statutory balancing the agency will have done already. The difference is that, in the court action, a payee’s disregard of the statute’s carefully-wrought administrative process for relief from repayment counts only as one among the factors to be balanced (though a possibly weighty one in a given case).

It is in the District’s, and the public’s, interest to ask whether this “hybrid” procedure, ante at 528, should not be replaced by a unified one within the framework of administrative law. That would have obvious advantages: It would comport with the way workers’ (and unemployment) compensation matters are all but exclusively handled otherwise; it would remove an occasional burden from a busy trial court; and, most significantly from the District’s standpoint, it would sharpen the teeth of the statute’s waiver provision for failure to comply with the administrative relief procedures.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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