relying on Glasscock v. Hamilton, 62 Tex. 143, 151 (Tex. 1884), and referring to a contribution claim as seeking a “debt”
How later courts described this case
- relying on Glasscock v. Hamilton, 62 Tex. 143, 151 (Tex. 1884), and referring to a contribution claim as seeking a “debt”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
On Motion for Rehearing.
Several assignments in the motion for rehearing complain of “holdings” that we did not “hold.” For instance, in the fourth assignment it is said that—
“This honorable court held that notwithstanding the fact that the declaration of trust forbade the managers, officers, and agents of the company from creating any personal liability on the respective stockholders, such provisions were not effective even as between the stockholders and officers themselves, and hold’ng in effect that notwithstanding the fact that the officers, agents, and managers of said company were not hound by their solemn agreement in the declaration of trust made with the respective stockholders who bought the stock of thei company on the strength of the contract in said declaration of trust, and notwithstanding the fact that the original plaintiffs did not sue and attempt to enforce the payment of the debts incurred on the common stockholders, that still the officers, agents, and managers in charge could, when the suit was brought against the company and them as individuals, interplead the common stockholders and require them to contribute to the payment of the debts incurred by said officers, agents, and managers.”
Tbe second and third assignments are somewhat along the same line. We did not so bold. None of tbe assignments of error on which tbe appeal is predicated present sucb a situation; they suggest no claim that tbe interpleaded defendants were not liable, if there was any personal liability at all on tbe part of 'tbe stockholders for tbe indebtedness of the association, to the same extent as tbe original defendants. Tbe only reference in tbe appellants’ brief to sucb question is that contained in tbe sixth proposition, as originally presented, which asserts that H. Beach, “who was one of tbe organizers of the Victor Refining Company, and who v^as always an officer of said company, and one of tbe principal stockholders therein,” could not recover of the other stockholders “for the reason that such action by him is prohibited by the articles of the association.” This proposition was net germane ito any assignment and was not considered. As a matter of fact, of the 18 original defendants, H. Beach was the only one who appears to have been an officer, agent, or trustee or had anything to do with the promotion of said association, and the other 17 of said original defendants being apparently “common stockholders” just like the interpleaded defendants and in the same boat with them.
The sixth assignment in the motion for rehearing was not presented originally and is not considered.
The other questions presented in the motion were carefully considered by us in our original disposition of the case, and we do not deem it necessary' to discuss them further.
Overruled.