The opinion
On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant files a motion for rehearing in this case, in which it is suggested that two members of this court are disqualified from sitting in this case, upon the ground that the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company is a party to this proceeding. It is further suggested that when this case was tried in the court below, and when the record was perfected on appeal, Hon. L. B. Hightower, Jr., Chief Justice of this court, was -retained as attorney for the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company at Beaumont, Tex., and it is stated upon information that Justice King was also retained for the same company at Nacogdoches, Tex.
With reference to the disqualification of these two members of the court, we have this to say: Speaking in and using the language first of the Chief Justice:
“From my recollection now, from this record, it is a fact that at the date of the filing of this suit in the lower court, and at the date of the disposition in the lower court, I was a member of the firm of Hightower, Orgain & Butler. The firm represented the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company as division attorneys only, and in connection with such litigation only as arose within several counties, including Jefferson county, Tex., and certain counties contiguous thereto, namely,, Liberty, Orange, Tyler, and Hardin counties; ' but said firm had no connection whatever with litigation of the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company in counties other than those named, and had no connection whatever with this suit instituted in Harris county, nor was it cognizant even of the institution or pendency of such litigation, and was not connected in any manner with the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, except as above stated, as division attorneys in the counties named.”
Using, also, the 'language of Justice King, we quote as follows:
“At the time of the filing of this suit, the firm of King & Seale were employed as local attorneys for the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, and such employment extended only to such cases as said company had in the courts of Nacogdoches county, Tex. My connection as local attorney at Nacogdoches for said company ceased on September 7, 1916, upon which date I moved to Beaumont. I have never been connected in any capacity with this suit, and never heard of same until it came up for consideration in this court.”
Therefore it will be seen that both Chief Justice Hightower and Associate Justice King were only connected with the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company in a local capacity. In other words, Chief Justice Hightower represented the said railroad company in the counties of Jefferson, Orange, Hardin, Tyler, and Liberty, and that he did not represent said company in any other counties, except the above-named; that he had no connection whatever ■ with this suit; that he was not apprised' even of the fact that such a suit had been instituted, or that it was being prosecuted; in other words, that he knew nothing of the existence of such a suit until the suit was filed in this court. Also, Mr. Justice King was only con *885 nected with the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company in a local capacity in his (Nacogdoches) county only, and had no cognizance of the existence of such a suit as the one in controversy, until the same had been brought to this court on appeal.
Therefore, in regard to the matter suggested as to the disqualification of two members of this court, it is just and proper to say that it is the opinion of the entire court that neither of said members of this court is in any way disqualified to sit upon and hear and determine said cause, and therefore, with reference to these matters, this court so holds. We have carefully examined the entire record in this case, perhaps more carefully, from the fact that all of the court, except the writer, were called in question as having been in some way interested in the matter, as having been counsel formerly for the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company. We have neither the time nor the inclination to take up and critically examine the matters complained of in this motion for rehearing; in fact, it is just a rehash of the matters heretofore brought to the attention of this court.
The motion for rehearing is therefore in all things overruled.