The opinion
On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion we concluded from the evidence that all reasonable men could draw but one conclusion, that is, that such evidence does not support the material findings of the trial court nor the judgment rendered thereupon, but to the contrary it showed that Nellie -Duekels, at the time she executed the deed of August 9, 1916, and all *732 other deeds tinder its terms, was fully capable of understanding and that she did understand and appreciate what she was doing, and that of her own free will she conveyed to her brother, Neil Duckels, the land describ-in all of said deeds for the considerations expressed in said deeds. We concluded further that the evidence showed that, even if Nellie was without capacity to execute said deed and thereby convey the property in question, she thereafter was restored to capacity, and that after such restoration, fully understanding the nature of all her transactions with her brother, she ratified all of such transactions and sought benefits thereunder, and therefore she is estopped from rescinding her said contracts and cannot now repudiate the same and avoid their provisions.
Upon these conclusions we reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the appellant.
Appellee, Nellie Duckels, has filed her motion for rehearing and insists that the conclusions so reached by us were erroneous.
After a careful review of the evidence, we are unable to agree with this contention. We are still of the opinion that there was no evidence of probative force to support the judgment of the trial court, and are strongly inclined to hold that the evidence shows a ratification of the contracts in question by Nellie Duckels at a time when she fully understood the effect thereof; but, after a further consideration of the whole case, we have concluded that the facts relative to these questions may not have been fully developed, and for this reason we should have reversed the judgment of the trial court and have remanded the cause for another trial, instead of rendering judgment for the appellant as we did.
We therefore grant the motion of appellee for rehearing, and order that the judgment heretofore rendered by this court be set aside; and further order that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.