The opinion
On Rehearing.
On the motion for rehearing counsel for appellant insist that our holding to the effect that the trial court did not err in looking to the record to render definite certain answers of the jury to special issues, is in conflict with the holding of the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals in Southern Lumber Co. v. Whiteman, 104 S.W.(2d) 635 .
Our holding here is not in conflict with the cited case. That case was -a boundary suit wherein the plaintiffs made several contentions with reference to the proper location 'of a disputed boundary. So the jury’s finding that the line was “as contended by plaintiffs” amounted to no specific finding. It was indefinite in that such verdict, in the words of Judge Funder-burk, “did not itself locate, nor furnish the means of locating, the disputed boundary.” In the case before us the issues as framed by the trial judge were clear and explicit. The answers of the jury thereto “amount as claimed,” “value as claimed,” etc., were rendered definite and certain by reference to the record.
It is a rule long sanctioned by the decisions- of our courts that reference may be had to the record for the purpose of removing ambiguities and ascertaining the true intent of the verdict of the jury. See James v. Wilson, 7 Tex. 230 ; Crenwelge v. Ponder (Tex.Com.App.) 228 S.W. 145 ; McElwrath v. City of McGregor (Tex.Civ.App.) 58 S.W.(2d) 851 ; Vincent v. Bell (Tex.Civ.App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 753 . Where the jury’s verdict can be ascertained with definiteness and certainty, as in the case before us, it would not be in keeping with justice or common sense to order a new trial merely because the jury may have disregarded the niceties of technical form iq returning the verdict.
It is also insisted that the trial court erred in declaring the amount due by the appellant for the reasonable value of the labor and materials a lien upon the cars which the appellant repossessed from the appellee.
It is not material, we think, that no lien was created by express contract or by operation of the statute. On the facts of the case the court was warranted in decreeing an equitable lien in favor of the appellee for the reasonable value of the labor and material expended upon the cars which the appellant wrongfully took from his possession. Upon such a state of facts equity may regard as done that which ought to be done. Luse v. Rea (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 942 , affirmed (Tex.Com.App.) 231 S.W. 310 . Such a lien may be, and often is, founded upon an implied contract as in the instant case. Longhart Supply Co. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 26 S.W.(2d) 389, 393 ; Batson v. Coley & Wilson (Tex.Civ.App.) 59 S.W.(2d) 445 ; Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Ass’n, 31 Tex.Civ.App. 375 , 72 S.W. 875 (writ refused). The principle is thus stated in 17 R.C.L. 605, and quoted with approval in Longhart Supply Co. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Co., supra: “Even in the absence of an express contract, a lien based upon the fundamental maxims of equity, may be implied and declared by a court of chancery out of general consideration of right and justice as applied to the relation of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings.”
Complaint is also made of our failure to discuss a number of assignments urged by the appellant. Something like 100 assignments are presented in the brief. It would serve no good purpose for us to take them *301 up seriatim. Moreover the matters complained of present questions of law which will be available to the appellant upon petition for writ of error.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.