holding that “[d]iscretionary denials of asylum to otherwise-eligible applicants” are an abuse of discretion when based on erroneous credibility determinations
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[d]iscretionary denials of asylum to otherwise-eligible applicants” are an abuse of discretion when based on erroneous credibility determinations
- holding that translation errors may undermine an adverse credibility determination when there is more than speculation, i.e., both a “strong indication” of translation errors and “extensive” corroboration
- holding that an IJ cannot “‘cherry pick’ facts or inconsistencies to support an adverse credibility finding that is unsupported by the record as a whole” (quotation marks and citation omitted)
- cataloging a handful of cases in which “egregious conduct” justified the “unusual” outcome of a discretionary denial of asylum (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DAVID W. McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT
I, too, agree that the IJ’s' and Board’s adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Maroufs’ petition for review be granted. However, to respect the congressionally-mandated deference to the agency, I express no opinion as to whether the petitioners are eligible for or facially deserving of asylum. The Supreme Court has made clear that, in determining asylum eligibility, the Courts of Appeal are “not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 , 123 S.Ct. 353 , 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (discussing the appropriateness of appellate determinations of asylum eligibility and noting that “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir.2013) (affirming the same). Accordingly, I decline to join sections II.E and II.F of this opinion, as well as any reference, either express of implied, that may be construed as mandating a grant of asylum for the petitioners.